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Michigan has faced serious economic problems since the last business cycle peak in 
2000. As shown in Figure ES-1, from 2000–2005, Michigan on average has declined by 1.3 
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Figure ES-1.  Michigan vs U.S. Employment Growth, Annual Percentage Rate 
 
Part of Michigan’s employment declines are attributable to slow national growth. From 
the business cycle peak of 1990 to the next business cycle peak of 2000, national employment 
growth was a robust 1.9 percent in additional employment per year. But from 2000 to 2005, 
national employment growth has slowed to only 0.3 percent per year.   
 
But Michigan has also suffered from an additional “growth gap” vs. the U.S. since 2000. 
During the 1990s, Michigan=s employment growth, at 1.7 percent per year, was only 0.2 percent 
per year behind the U.S. average. Since 2000, Michigan=s average annual employment growth 
has been over 1.5 percent behind the U.S. average. 
 
This report considers the following types of questions: 
 
1) What has caused Michigan’s increased growth gap compared to the growth of the U.S.? 
Is this due to problems in Michigan=s public policies, such as allegedly excessive 
Michigan taxes or an allegedly inadequate Michigan education system? 
 
2) Regardless of the causes of Michigan’s increased growth gap, what is the potential for 
Michigan to improve its employment growth with better business tax policies or 
education policies? 
 
THE CAUSES OF MICHIGAN’S SLOW GROWTH VS. THE U.S.’S 
 
Our report’s analysis suggests that Michigan’s slow growth in recent years vs. the U.S.’s 
can be explained by Michigan’s overspecialization in the Big Three auto companies. The share 
of Michigan’s employment in motor vehicles is over seven times the national average. 
Furthermore, each job lost in the Michigan motor vehicle industry causes a loss of more than 
four other jobs in other industries in the short run, and more than five other jobs in other 
industries in the long run. Many Michigan businesses are dependent on the spending either of the 
Big Three in purchasing supplies, or of the Big Three’s workers in purchasing consumer goods 
and services. 
 
Since 2000, the overall automobile industry has fared poorly throughout the nation. In 
addition, the share of Michigan=s auto industry in the national market has sagged.  
 
To put this in quantitative terms, our analysis suggests that the overall slow growth of the 
auto industry has depressed Michigan=s employment growth since 2000 by perhaps 1.8 percent. 
As shown in Figure ES-1, if the auto industry had done better, Michigan=s employment growth 
from 2000 to 2005 would probably have been close to the U.S. average. 
 
This finding makes it unlikely that Michigan’s recent slow growth is primarily due to 
allegedly excessive business taxes or inadequate job skills. The slow growth of autos in 
Michigan is probably due to national and international trends and to trends in the auto industry, 
not to the state of Michigan’s policy choices. 
 
ARE MICHIGAN=S BUSINESS TAXES UNCOMPETITIVE? 
 
Even though Michigan’s business taxes are unlikely to be a major factor in explaining the 
state=s recent slow growth, the question remains as to whether our taxes are out of line with those 
of the U.S. and our competitor states. 
 
As shown in Table ES-1, using three different tax measures, the most recent measures of 
Michigan’s taxes suggest that Michigan’s taxes and business taxes are actually slightly below the 
U.S. average. Depending on the tax measure one uses, Michigan’s taxes appear to be from 5 to 
19 percent below the U.S. average. 
 
Similar results occur when comparing Michigan’s taxes to such nearby competitors as 
Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio. In addition, Michigan=s taxes appear to have trended downwards 
relative to the U.S. average for all states and relative to our nearby competitor states. 
Table ES-1.  Michigan’s Taxes vs. the U.S. Average, Three Different Tax Measures 
Overall state and local taxes per 
dollar of personal income 
Average state and local business 
taxes per dollar of private gross 
state product 
State and local business taxes on 
investment in a new business 
facility 
5% below U.S. average 12% below U.S. average 19% below U.S. average 
NOTE: Based on Table 5 of full report. For each type of tax, we are using the most recent data available. 
 
WHAT COULD BUSINESS TAX CUTS DO FOR THE MICHIGAN ECONOMY? 
 
Even if Michigan’s business taxes are competitive, further cuts in Michigan’s business 
taxes might be able to boost the economy. For this report, we use the best available regional 
econometric model of Michigan’s economy to simulate the possible effects of abolishing 
Michigan’s Single Business Tax on Michigan’s annual employment growth rate. We find that 
the economic effects of this policy depend crucially on how this policy change is financed. In 
particular, we reach the following conclusions: 
 
1) If the abolition of Michigan’s Single Business Tax is financed by a reduction in public 
spending and public services, the estimated effects in boosting growth range from a 
positive 0.09 percent per year to a negative 0.01 percent per year (i.e., this policy change 
might reduce Michigan=s growth rate), depending upon assumptions about how public 
services affect business productivity and costs.  
 
2) If the abolition of Michigan’s Single Business Tax is financed by broadening the sales 
tax to include services, this policy change would boost Michigan=s annual employment 
growth rate by 0.13 percent per year. 
 
3) If the abolition of Michigan’s current Single Business Tax leads to its replacement with a 
business tax that raises similar revenue but imposes zero additional costs on new business 
investment by giving investment tax credits or deductions, then this policy change would 
boost Michigan=s annual employment growth rate by 0.16 percent per year. 
 
Therefore, under a wide variety of assumptions, a major business tax change such as 
abolishing Michigan’s Single Business Tax, while it may boost growth, is unlikely to solve more 
than a small proportion of Michigan’s recent growth gap behind the U.S. Recall that Michigan’s 
growth gap in annual employment growth vs. the U.S.’s is over 1.5 percent per year. These 
business tax changes would make up no more than one-ninth of this growth gap at best. 
 
How a business tax cut is financed matters because a state’s economy is affected by 
public spending as well as by tax policy. Cuts in public spending have two potential types of 
negative effects on a state=s economy. First, reduced public spending reduces jobs and wages for 
public employees, as well as for employees in private organizations that contract with the 
government. The reduction in jobs and wages in publicly financed organizations in turn leads to 
reduced consumer spending, which reduces jobs in many private firms. Second, reduced public 
spending, if it reduces the quality of public services, may reduce the attractiveness of a state to 
both businesses and households. The quality of roads and other infrastructure, as well as of 
education and job training programs and other services, may directly and immediately affect 
some businesses’ productivity and costs, which will affect their interest in locating and 
expanding in the state. In addition, if cuts in public services lead to households not choosing to 
locate in the state, this may adversely affect the cost and availability of labor to businesses, 
which will eventually also affect business location and expansion decisions. 
 
WHAT COULD BOOSTS IN EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT DO FOR MICHIGAN=S 
ECONOMY? 
 
Recent research on regional economies suggests that regional economies with a greater 
proportion of college graduates are more successful. These regional economies are more 
successful in two dimensions. First, regional economies with more college graduates appear to 
be able to sustain higher wages for all workers, including workers who don’t go to college. 
Second, regional economies with more college graduates appear to have greater long-run growth. 
 
These social benefits of more education for regional economic growth probably occur 
because of effects of greater overall education on productivity. When the local workforce is more 
educated, firms find it easier to obtain workers who can readily use more productive 
technologies. Furthermore, more-educated workers find it easier to use new technologies that 
firms may wish to introduce. 
 
Improvements in the education of Michigan’s workers could make a significant 
contribution to closing Michigan’s growth gap, but only under certain conditions. 
 
1) The increase in Michigan’s educational attainment has to be quite large to have large 
effects upon the growth gap. For example, to completely close the 1.5 percent annual 
growth gap with the U.S. would require an increase of about 25 points in the percentage 
of Michigan residents with a college degree. This is about double Michigan’s current 
percentage of residents with a college degree. 
 
2) To achieve such large increases in educational attainment would require long-term 
sustained efforts, which would only fully pay off for Michigan’s economic development 
in the long run. For example, suppose we increase the proportion of current K–12 
students who successfully complete college by 25 percentage points. Even if this does not 
lead to an increase in out-migration of Michigan college graduates, this policy would take 
about 50 years to increase the proportion of Michigan’s workforce having a college 
degree by 25 percentage points. A little less than a quarter of this effect would be 
achieved within about 15 years of initiating the policy. 
 
3) Increases in educational attainment would be expected to not only attract more and 
better-paying businesses, but also to lead to more net out-migration of college residents 
from Michigan. Estimates suggest that without some policy to make Michigan more 
attractive to college-educated migrants, for every 100 additional Michigan residents who 
become college graduates, in the long run the number of college graduates in Michigan 
will only go up by about 30 more college graduates. This occurs because the increased 
supply of college graduates makes it harder for college graduates in Michigan to find 
appropriate jobs at good pay.  A consequence is increased net out-migration of college 
graduates from Michigan. 
 
4) Therefore, to fully realize the economic benefits of greater educational attainment of 
Michigan’s K–12 students, educational reforms must be accompanied by policies to 
increase the attractiveness of Michigan to college graduates. These policies could include 
measures to improve amenities that are attractive to college graduates, and economic 
development policies that encourage the location or expansion of businesses that will 




Michigan’s recent slow growth is largely due to our overdependence on the fortunes of 
the auto industry, not to excessive Michigan business taxes. 
 
In the short run, it is difficult for any Michigan policy to fully offset the large negative 
effects of the competitive challenges facing the Big Three auto companies.  
 
In the medium run and long run, business tax reforms that lowered the taxes on new 
investment, without cutting public spending and public services, could make some contribution 
to partially reducing Michigan’s growth gap with the U.S. Such policies would require 
increasing taxes on some businesses and households to make up for the loss of revenue from 
reduced taxes on businesses making new investments. 
 
In the long run, educational policies that increased the percentage of more skilled 
workers in Michigan’s economy could also make a significant contribution to reducing the gap 
between Michigan’s growth and that of the U.S. economy. To be most effective, such policies 
would have to increase educational attainment among Michigan=s students, while also making 
Michigan a more attractive place for college graduates to live and work. 
 1
1.  INTRODUCTION 
This report considers Michigan’s competitiveness. The “competitiveness” of a state is 
here defined as features of the state that can be altered by public policy and that affect the state’s 
attractiveness for economic growth, which can raise both wages and employment rates. 
A state’s economic growth is arguably affected by all the state’s features, including many 
that cannot be changed by public policy, such as climate, and others that are quite difficult to 
change through policy, such as market wages.  Our focus in this report is on features of 
Michigan that affect growth and can be readily influenced by public policy, such as taxes, public 
spending, educational attainment of the state’s population, and skills of the state’s population. 
We choose to focus on ways in which Michigan’s employment growth might be 
improved without lowering wages.  There are several reasons for this choice.  First, the state 
cannot easily lower wages, although some state policies may influence wages, such as minimum 
wage policy, labor regulation, and policy towards unions. Second, the issue of how wages affect 
growth is complicated and controversial. This issue is theoretically complicated because higher 
wages may not only increase business costs, but may also increase worker productivity by 
increasing incentives to work hard and by attracting higher productivity workers. This issue is 
empirically complicated because there is significant controversy over the effects of government 
policies to regulate wages. For example, in the empirical research on the impact of minimum 
wage regulation, most economists conclude that the effect of higher state minimum wages on 
employment is modestly negative, but some economists conclude that the effect of higher state 
minimum wages on employment is zero or even positive (Card and Krueger 1995; Neumark and 
Wascher 1997; Neumark 1999).  Third, increasing a state’s employment growth by lowering 
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wages is obviously not the most desirable way to increase growth; we would prefer growth that 
raises both employment rates and wage rates. 
Therefore, the plan for this paper is to address the following selective aspects of 
Michigan’s competitiveness: 
First, we briefly review how the state has fared from 1990 to 2000 (the previous business 
cycle), and from 2000 to 2005 (the current business cycle). As is well-known, these trends show 
the state has done quite poorly in the current business cycle relative to the United States. 
Second, we present empirical evidence on which industry trends have contributed to the 
state’s recent economic performance. To the extent that the state’s performance is due to national 
industry trends, or trends in particular firms, bad public policy is unlikely to have caused the 
current poor performance of the state’s economy. As we will show, the state’s current poor 
performance is mainly due to the state’s over reliance on the Big Three auto companies. 
However, this does not mean that public policy could not have effects on Michigan’s economic 
performance. 
Third, we review the empirical evidence on Michigan’s competitiveness on taxes. We 
will show that Michigan is quite competitive on taxes today compared to the average state, and 
compared to our nearby competitor states. Our tax competitiveness seems to have improved over 
time. However, it would be desirable for the state to have more updated and detailed information 
on the best measure of business tax competitiveness, which is the marginal tax rate on new 
business investment. 
Fourth, we examine how the Michigan economy would be affected by current proposals 
to eliminate the Single Business Tax (SBT). As this analysis will show, the estimated effects 
vary depending upon what one assumes about the sensitivity of business location to taxes, and on 
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how the SBT elimination is financed. However, under the most plausible assumptions, the 
effects of SBT elimination on Michigan growth are modest. SBT elimination, or any other way 
of lowering marginal tax rates on business investment, has more positive effects on Michigan’s 
employment growth if such a tax change is financed without reducing public spending or public 
services. 
Fifth, we briefly review the evidence on how Michigan’s growth is affected by the 
educational attainment of Michigan’s workforce. As is well known, the state is below average in 
its percentage of college-educated workers. Significantly increasing the state’s economic 
performance by improving the educational attainment of Michigan workers is a strategy that 
takes a long time to accomplish and requires addressing both the educational attainment of 
Michigan’s youth and the attractiveness of Michigan to well-educated migrants. 
Sixth, we examine Michigan’s competitiveness on specific occupational skills with 
strong national demand.  We do this by looking at occupations in which Michigan has an above-
average share and in which national wage trends appear strong. We briefly review what kinds of 
industries most intensively use these occupational skills; the types suggest some industrial 
targets that may deserve consideration. 
Finally, we summarize the policy lessons of these findings.  
A technical appendix presents results from another recent Upjohn Institute study of the 
competitiveness of different metropolitan areas. From an economic standpoint, a state is not one 
regional economy but rather a collection of different regional economies, most of which are 
metropolitan areas. As this appendix shows, the competitiveness of Michigan’s metropolitan 




2.  MICHIGAN’S RECENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, since the business cycle peak of 2000, Michigan on average 
has declined in employment by about 1.3 percent per year. This is considerably worse economic 
performance than that of the U.S., which has had mediocre but positive employment growth 
averaging about 0.3 percent per year. 
Michigan’s recent economic performance is also in contrast with its absolute and relative 
performance, compared to the U.S., during the period from the business cycle peak of 1990 to 
the business cycle peak of 2000. During that business cycle, Michigan’s average annual 
employment growth was about 1.7 percent, only slightly behind the U.S.’s employment growth 
of 1.9 percent annually. 
Are these recent trends attributable to bad Michigan public policies, or do they have other 
causes? And regardless of the causes of Michigan’s recent poor performance, what is the 
potential for changes in Michigan’s public policies to increase the state’s employment growth? 
 
3.  INDUSTRY TRENDS AND MICHIGAN’S RECENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
A common method in regional economics of analyzing a region’s growth, and how a 
region’s growth is affected by its industries, is shift-share analysis. This approach divides a 
region’s differential from overall national growth into two components:  1) the “share 
component,” which depends on whether the region has above-average or below-average shares 
of industries that happen to be fast-growing or slow-growing nationally, and 2) the “shift 
component,” which depends on whether industries in the region grow faster or slower than their 
national counterparts (whether these industries are “shifting” to the region). 
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In addition to calculating the overall “share” and “shift” components, it is useful to look 
at the industry components that are summed to generate these components. The individual 
industry data allow us to see to what degree a region’s specialization in a particular industry is 
hurting or helping its growth, and to see to what degree the industry is underperforming or 
outperforming its national counterpart. It should be understood that these industry shift effects, 
which represent an industry’s growth advantage or disadvantage over the industry’s national 
counterpart, will be interrelated across different industries in the same region.  For nonexport-
base industries—that is, industries that mostly sell to buyers within the region—most of the 
difference of the industry’s growth in a region from the industry’s national growth will depend 
on what happens to other industries in the region. Even for export-base industries, which are 
defined as industries that sell most of their output to buyers outside the region, the portion of the 
output sold within the region may influence an industry’s measured shift effect. 
This shift-share analysis was done on 92 industry categories in Michigan for two time 
periods, 1990–2000 and 2000–20005, using the same data that we’ve been using on Michigan 
and U.S. nonfarm employment. Table 1 summarizes this information by aggregating these 92 
industry categories into four industrial categories:  1) motor vehicles and other transportation 
equipment, 2) federal employment, 3) other export-base industries, and 4) other nonexport-base 
industries. 
Rather than reporting the data as annual percentage growth rates, Table 1 reports data as 
annual job gains or losses, which allows the data to add up properly and facilitates discussion of 
multiplier effects of one industry on other industries. As the table shows, after gaining about 
70,000 jobs per year during the 1990s, Michigan lost about 58,000 jobs per year during the 
current decade, a decline in performance of 128,000 jobs per year. A little over half of this 
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declining job performance is due to slower national job growth. Even if Michigan had grown at 
the national average in both time periods, annual job gains in Michigan would have declined by 
about 69,000 jobs.  
The shift-share analysis suggests that the remaining half of Michigan’s poorer job 
performance in the current decade, compared to the 1990s, is attributable to Michigan’s strong 
dependence on the Big Three auto companies and to the challenges these companies have faced 
in the current decade. To understand why this is so, we need to remember that for many 
industries, their performance in Michigan depends on other Michigan industries, because these 
other industries or their workers buy their goods and services.  What this chart shows is that the 
share effect for transportation equipment declined from a positive 1,000 jobs per year in the 
1990s to a negative 10,000 jobs per year in the current decade. In other words, the generally slow 
national employment growth of the auto industry, even if Michigan automakers had kept their 
share of the national market, would have directly caused an annual swing in Michigan job 
growth of 11,000 jobs per year. In addition, Michigan automakers have lost more national 
market share in the U.S. auto industry in the current decade than they did in the 1990s. In the 
1990s, the loss of national market share for Michigan auto producers cost about 3,000 lost jobs 
per year; in the current decade, this escalated to a loss of 9,000 jobs per year, for a total swing of 
an additional 6,000 jobs lost per year. 
Thus, the slow national growth of the auto industry caused Michigan’s annual job growth 
to deteriorate by about 11,000 jobs per year, and the declining share of Michigan automakers in 
the national auto market caused Michigan’s annual job growth to deteriorate by 6,000 lost jobs 
per year. We would expect this total swing in auto job creation, a negative swing of about 17,000 
jobs per year, to have multiplier effects on many other Michigan industries, both export-base and 
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nonexport-base. For example, less auto job creation, or outright job declines, would hurt the 
plastics industry, which supplies many parts to the auto industry, as well as hurting many 
wholesale and retail industries that sell goods and services to the auto industry’s workers. Our 
work with the well-regarded REMI regional econometric model for Michigan suggests that the 
employment multiplier for motor vehicles in Michigan is about 5. With a multiplier of 5, a swing 
of 17,000 jobs in autos in a negative direction would be sufficient to cause a negative swing in 
total Michigan employment of about 85,000. This actually exceeds the deterioration in 
Michigan’s employment, relative to the nation’s, of 60,000 jobs per year. That is, poor trends 
nationally in autos, and in Michigan’s share of the auto industry, more than explain why 
Michigan’s job growth has deteriorated relative to the nation’s in this decade.  
To translate this back into annual growth terms, this swing of 85,000 jobs per year, if 
restored, would be equivalent to additional growth of 1.84 percent per year during the 2000–
2005 time period. This more than makes up for Michigan’s lag of 1.52 percent behind the nation 
during this period. Michigan’s total employment growth would have improved by 1.19 percent 
per year if national trends in autos have been similar to the average industry.  Michigan’s total 
employment growth would have improved by 0.65 percent per year if Michigan had maintained 
its market share in autos. 
An additional, minor factor is that Michigan has had some modestly unfavorable trends 
in federal employment. Michigan has a below average share in federal employment, which 
generally has been a declining sector, but less so in 2000–2005 than in 1990–2000. In addition, 
Michigan has had larger percentage losses in federal employment than is true for the nation as a 
whole. Given a modest multiplier of 1.5 or so, it seems plausible that trends in national and 
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Michigan federal employment have probably caused Michigan’s annual job growth in the current 
decade to deteriorate by perhaps 3,000 jobs per year compared to the 1990s.  
It is unlikely that national trends in motor vehicles are due to Michigan’s economic 
policies. Trends in Michigan’s share of the total national market in motor vehicles have more to 
do with the fortunes of the Big Three auto companies than with Michigan’s economic policies.  
Therefore, these results suggest that Michigan’s poor employment performance in the current 
decade is unlikely to be primarily due to poor policy choices by the state. At the least, it can be 
said that there is no need for a hypothesis that blames it on policy, as we can explain all or 
almost all of the state’s poor economic performance by trends in the Big Three auto companies. 
However, this does not mean that better Michigan economic policies could not improve 
the state’s economic performance. How competitive is the state in its tax policies and its human 
capital policies? What could the state plausibly achieve by changes in these policies? 
 
4.  MICHIGAN’S TAX COMPETITIVENESS 
Few economists believe that state and local business taxes have large effects on a state’s 
economic development. The majority view among economists is that higher state business taxes, 
other things being equal, have modestly negative effects on a state’s economic development.  
This consensus is based on a significant research literature examining how state and local growth 
responds to changes in state and local business taxes. As summarized by Wasylenko (1997), 
building on an earlier review of the research literature by Bartik (1991), the majority view 
among economists is that the long-run effect of a 10 percent cut in state and local business taxes, 
holding other effects on business location constant, is to raise business activity in a state by 
about 2 percent.  
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A significant minority of economists disagrees with the majority view and believes that 
the effects of state and local business taxes are so small as to be negligible (McGuire 2003; 
Lynch 2004). This minority points to some well-done studies that find no effects of state and 
local business taxes on state economic development. In addition, this minority points out that 
state and local business taxes are quite small compared to other business costs. For example, 
state and local business taxes in Michigan are estimated to be about $3,946 per employee, which 
is equivalent to a little less than $2 per hour (Bartik 2006a, updating figures from Ernst and 
Young 2004). Average hourly wages in the U.S. are about $18 per hour, so straight labor costs, 
even excluding employee benefits, are over nine times state and local business taxes. 
Furthermore, research has found modest effects of business costs such as labor costs on business 
location decisions. This suggests that the likely effects of state and local business taxes are even 
smaller. 
The majority view among economists, that there are modestly negative effects of 
business taxes on state economic development, is based on considering the effects of business 
taxes, holding other location factors constant. But often business tax cuts are financed in ways 
that may alter local economic growth. If business tax cuts are financed by cutting public 
services, the public service cuts may negatively affect a state’s economic development in two 
ways. First, the cut in public spending reduces public sector jobs and reduces private sector 
activity and jobs that depend on purchases from the government or government workers. Second, 
businesses may value public services. There is at least some research that suggests that business 
tax cuts, financed by cutting productive public services such as investment in roads or public 
education, may harm a state’s economic development (e.g., see review by Fisher (1997) and 
studies by Bartik (1999, 1989), Munnell (1990), and Helms (1985)). 
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In this report, we consider three sources of data on Michigan’s tax competitiveness. Each 
source has its advantages and disadvantages. The first source is Census data on state and local 
taxes, divided by Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates of state personal income.  The second 
source is Ernst and Young estimates of total state and local business taxes, divided by private-
sector gross state product data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The third source is 
estimates by Peter Fisher and Alan Peters of the University of Iowa of marginal business taxes 
on business investment, as measured by the additional tax liability due to building a new 
business facility in the state divided by the profits from the new facility. 
The Census data on total state and local taxes is high-quality data that have been 
calculated in a consistent way for more than 30 years. The big disadvantage of these data is that 
over half of state and local taxes are household taxes, not business taxes (Ernst and Young 
2006). Household taxes have no direct, immediate effect on business location decisions. The 
effects of household taxes on business location would occur indirectly to the extent that 
household taxes altered household migration patterns or labor supply decisions, which in turn 
would affect worker wages and availability, which in turn would affect business location 
decisions. Any such effects would take some time to occur. Furthermore, household migration 
decisions depend on the whole package offered by the state: public services and amenities as 
well as taxes, for example. It is generally believed that households directly receive more in state 
and local public services than they pay in taxes, whereas the reverse is true for businesses 
(Oakland and Testa 1996). Therefore, it is not obvious that higher household taxes, when their 
effect on public services is considered, have a long-run negative effect on business location 
decisions. 
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The Ernst and Young (2004, 2005, 2006) estimates of state and local business taxes are 
only publicly available for individual states for recent years. However, these data do use the best 
available methodology for calculating average state and local business tax rates. The Ernst and 
Young researchers, who are well-respected public finance economists, use the best methodology 
available to allocate all major state and local taxes to businesses or households. Private-sector 
gross state product is probably the best indicator of private-sector business activity in a state.  
One significant limitation of Ernst and Young’s estimates is that they only reflect average 
business taxes. What should be most relevant to business location decisions is the marginal tax 
rate on business investment—for example, how much a business’s taxes go up if it builds a new 
plant or invests in an existing plant. In the long run, it is these investment decisions that 
determine the magnitude of business activity in a state.  
Average business taxes on existing business activity may not be similar to marginal 
business taxes on new business investment. For example, a state’s average tax rates on existing 
business activity could be quite high, but investment tax credits, tax deductions, or economic 
development incentives could mean that new business investment will result in little additional 
tax liability. 
The best and most recent data on marginal business tax rates is from Peters and Fisher 
(2002). Their research takes full account of all of the complex ways in which new investment 
decisions by business affects business tax liability. They construct hypothetical balance sheets 
for typical firms and then consider how the business’s tax liability would be altered by a business 
investment decision, for example a new plant. Such calculations must consider factors such as 
the state’s formula for allocating the business tax base of multistate businesses across different 
states, as well as economic development incentives. 
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The main limitation of Peters and Fisher’s research is that the most recent year for which 
these data are available is 1998. We know that states continue to modify their tax system and 
economic development incentives to try to increase their attractiveness to business, so it would 
be desirable to have more recent information. 
In examining Michigan’s competitiveness by these three measures of taxes, we consider 
data on Michigan, the U.S. as a whole, and Michigan’s nearby competitor states of Indiana, 
Illinois, and Ohio. Research on business location decisions suggests that factors such as taxes 
probably have greater scope once the location decision has been narrowed down to relatively 
fewer states, which frequently are nearby states that offer similar access to markets and 
suppliers. Therefore, Michigan should be more concerned with its competitiveness with Indiana, 
Illinois, and Ohio than with its competitiveness with more distant states. 
Figure 3 and Table 2 present the Census data on overall state and local taxes in Michigan 
as a percentage of state personal income, compared to the U.S. average, for all years from 1970 
to 2004. The table also considers Michigan’s nearby competitors. As can be seen in the figure 
and table, Michigan, after being somewhat above the U.S. average and its nearby competitors in 
the 1970s and 1980s, has generally had declining taxes relative to the U.S. and nearby states. By 
2004, overall state and local taxes in Michigan as a percentage of income were below similarly 
calculated tax rates in the U.S as a whole, were significantly below Ohio’s rates, and were 
virtually identical to those in Illinois and Indiana. Because state and local business taxes as a 
percentage of personal income fluctuate up and down with the economy, it is difficult to 
precisely date the decline of Michigan’s overall state and local tax rates, but there appear to have 
been significant declines in the mid-1980s, again in the mid-1990s, and again in the current 
decade. 
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Figure 4 and Table 3 present the Ernst and Young data on average state and local 
business taxes in Michigan as a percentage of private gross state product, compared to the U.S. 
average. The table also considers Michigan’s neighboring states. As can be seen in the figure and 
table, Michigan has generally been quite close to the national average for state and local business 
taxes, and has been quite similar to its neighboring states in business taxes, for most of the 
period from 2000 on. In the last two years, Michigan’s average business tax rates have dipped 
below the U.S. average and the averages for its neighboring states. In part, this reflects some 
reductions in average business tax rates in Michigan, which may reflect some recent state policy 
changes affecting business taxes. But Michigan’s gain relative to the United States and its 
neighbors also reflects some increases in business tax rates in other states. These increases may 
be in part due to the pro-cyclical nature of business corporate income taxes in many states, as 
business profits tend to increase faster than gross state product during the upswing stage of a 
business cycle (and decline faster than gross state product when the economy declines). In 
contrast, Michigan has a business tax system that includes the Single Business Tax, a tax 
designed to depend more on business activity than on profits. Therefore, Michigan’s business 
taxes would be expected to increase less with economic recovery. In addition, Michigan has not 
shared much in the recovery. 
Table 4 presents the Fisher and Peters data on marginal state and local business taxes for 
Michigan, nearby states, and for the typical U.S. state.  These data represent the average across 
16 industries of the marginal tax rate on a new plant located in the state. This marginal tax rate is 
calculated as the present value of the additional state and local taxes the business will pay over a 
20-year period because of the new plant, divided by the present value of the profits generated by 
the new plant. These data are only available for two years, 1990 and 1998. We report both the 
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tax rate considering only regular state and local business taxes, and the tax rate also considering 
general economic development incentives. 
As these data show, state and local marginal business tax rates on new investment 
declined in the 1990s. The decline of marginal business tax rates is greater when economic 
development incentives are considered. Michigan had an even faster decline in marginal tax rates 
on new business investment than these nearby states and the typical state. By 1998, Michigan’s 
net marginal tax rates on new investments were below the typical state and all its neighboring 
states except Illinois, whether or not we include economic development incentives. When 
incentives are included, Michigan’s net business tax rates on new investment are about the same 
as Illinois’s as of 1998.  One hypothesis about Michigan’s decline in marginal business tax rates 
is that it was during this period that Michigan changed its formula apportionment to give a 
greater weight to sales when allocating the business tax base of multistate firms. A greater sales 
weight significantly reduces marginal business tax rates on new investment on export-base firms 
with multistate operations. 
Figure 5 and Table 5 summarize the tax information from all three types of tax rates. The 
data are summarized as the ratio of Michigan’s tax rate to the analogous U.S. tax rate for the 
same year. As is consistent with the previous discussion, these data show a Michigan tax rate 
that has declined from the 1980s on. By the latest data available on all three types of tax rates, 
Michigan is somewhat below the average U.S. state and local tax rate. Therefore, Michigan’s 
poor economic performance in recent years cannot be attributed to unusually high tax rates, as 
Michigan’s tax rates are no longer high compared to the nation’s, and have declined in recent 
years. The impression that Michigan is a high tax state is based on historical patterns rather than 
current reality.  
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However, this does not necessarily mean that still lower business tax rates would not help 
spur Michigan’s economy. We will explore this possibility next. 
 
5.  THE EFFECTS OF CUTTING BUSINESS TAXES ON IMPROVING MICHIGAN=S 
ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 
 
We now consider the effects of cutting business taxes on improving Michigan’s 
economic performance. As we will see, the effects depend on estimates of business tax effects on 
state economic development, and on how the tax cut is financed. However, under plausible 
assumptions, feasible business tax cuts seem unlikely to come close to solving the problem of 
Michigan’s slow growth relative to the U.S.’s growth 
Given the current debate over the Michigan Single Business Tax (SBT), we consider the 
likely effects of complete elimination of the Single Business Tax. We first consider effects using 
the REMI model and its default parameters and estimated behavioral elasticities—in particular 
its estimates of how state business activity responds to changes in business costs. We examine 
effects on Michigan’s economy over the 10-year period of 2006–2016 from abolishing the Single 
Business Tax in 2006. The cut in the Single Business Tax is modeled as reducing business 
production costs, with this business production cost reduction allocated across industries based 
on estimates of the share of the Single Business Tax paid by each industry. These lower 
production costs have positive supply-side effects on the Michigan economy by attracting new 
business activity to Michigan and allowing Michigan businesses to gain a greater share of 
national and international markets.  In addition, the cut in the Single Business Tax also increases 
the dividend income of some Michigan residents by increasing business profits, which has 
demand-side effects on Michigan’s economy as these residents increase their spending, including 
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spending on Michigan goods. However, most of the increase in profits will go to out-of-state 
residents who own stock in Michigan businesses.  
The elimination of the Single Business Tax eliminates about $1.9 billion annually in state 
revenue. For the initial simulation, we assume that this tax cut is financed by an equal-sized cut 
in public spending to meet the requirement of keeping the state budget balanced. This cut in 
public spending is allowed to have demand-side effects on the economy by reducing state and 
local government employment, and employment in private sector organizations financed by 
government spending, as well as having multiplier effects in reducing employment in businesses 
that supply the state government or sell goods and services to state workers. However, in this 
initial simulation we do not allow cuts in government spending to have any supply-side effects 
on the state’s economy by affecting the quality of public services to businesses and households 
in Michigan. Such supply-side effects, which seem plausible, would include the effects of such 
services as education and roads on business productivity and costs, and the effects of education, 
roads, and amenities such as parks on the quality of life of households and hence on household 
migration decisions. The financing of the Single Business Tax elimination by cuts in these 
services would be expected to have negative effects on business and household location 
decisions and hence the state economy, which we do not allow for in this initial simulation. 
As shown in Table 6, the resulting simulation suggests that elimination of the Single 
Business Tax, financed by cuts in public spending, will actually have a negative effect on the 
state’s employment growth over a 10-year time horizon. Rather than helping close the gap 
between state and national employment growth, elimination of the SBT would exacerbate the 
state’s growth problems. These negative effects of SBT elimination occur because the negative 
effects of public spending reduction on publicly financed jobs, and the multiplier effects of this 
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reduction on other jobs, outweigh the incentives for business location provided by lower 
business tax rates. 
The REMI model’s parameters for how Michigan’s businesses will respond to business 
tax cuts are derived from empirical estimation in which a state’s share of the national market 
depends upon overall business costs, with tax costs a relatively minor portion of business costs 
compared to other factors such as labor costs. As we mentioned, this is consistent with the view 
of a significant minority within economics that believes that business tax effects on business 
location decisions are so minor as to be negligible. However, empirical estimation that directly 
looks at the effects of business taxes on a state’s economic activity tends to find larger effects.  
The majority view among economists is that business tax effects on economic activity are 
somewhat larger than the estimates that underlie the REMI model. 
In the second simulation, we impose the larger business tax cost elasticities which reflect 
the view of most economists on the effects of business tax cuts.  This is a long-run elasticity of 
about −0.2. To do this, we have to multiply the production cost reductions due to SBT 
elimination by about 2.55. We continue to assume that this tax cut is financed by cuts in public 
spending, which have demand-side effects on employment but are not allowed to have any 
supply-side effects on the attractiveness of Michigan to businesses and households. 
Under these assumptions, over a 10-year period, SBT elimination would boost the 
Michigan economy by an increase in annual growth of 0.09 percent. While this is a positive 
effect, it is less than one-fifteenth of the gap of over 1.52 percent in annual growth between 
Michigan and the U.S. average. 
One issue is whether the positive effects of SBT elimination in this simulation might 
improve the state’s fiscal situation sufficiently to reduce the required cuts in public services, 
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which would further boost the state’s economy. This simulation does not allow for such dynamic 
feedback effects of state tax policy. However, the results of the simulation suggest that any 
positive effects of this greater employment growth on the state’s fiscal situation are likely to be 
quite small. After 10 years, this simulation estimates that the SBT elimination and $1.9 billion 
annual public spending cut have increased real income of persons residing in Michigan by 
$4.770 billion, a 1.3 percent increase in Michigan real income. This real income increase is 
partly due to a 0.8 percent increase in total Michigan nominal personal income, and partly due to 
a −0.5 percent reduction in Michigan prices due to lower production costs brought about by the 
SBT cut. This real income increase is likely to boost state and local revenue by a similar 
percentage. If 10.52 percent of this revenue goes to state and local taxes, as was true for 
Michigan in 2004, state and local tax revenue in Michigan will go up by $502 million. However, 
the simulation also estimates that the SBT cut and the public spending cut will increase 
Michigan’s population by 0.95 percent. If total public spending needs increase proportionately 
with the population, required public spending will increase by $365 million. Under this 
assumption that public spending needs are proportionate with population, the net fiscal dividend 
from the SBT elimination is only $137 million, a small proportion of the $1.9 billion cut in the 
SBT. The exact increase in public spending needs would depend on many factors. Public 
spending needs could increase more than population if the population increase is accommodated 
by sprawl that requires expensive new public infrastructure. 
This second simulation, while it may increase the effects of state business taxes to a point 
that is closer to the majority view among economists, does not allow for any positive effects of 
public services in increasing business productivity or reducing business costs, or attracting 
households. However, we would think there would be some such effects. If such effects of public 
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services on business costs are even at a level of just 60 percent of the effects of taxes, then we 
would be back to the estimates of the first simulation. The second simulation multiplies the 
REMI effects of business taxes on production costs by 2.55 to get higher elasticities. If the cut in 
public services of $1.9 billion has an effect in raising business costs of just 61 percent (1.55 / 
2.55) of the effect of business taxes in reducing costs, then the first simulation will still be 
correct. But, as we mentioned, there are many studies that suggest that businesses do place some 
value on public services in making business location decisions. In some simulations, balanced 
budget cuts in business taxes and public services have negative effects on a state’s business 
activity. This looks quite plausible here. It is reasonable to assume that the true effects of SBT 
elimination financed by cuts in public spending and public services would be somewhere 
between a 0.09 percent boost in annual employment growth and a 0.01 percent reduction in 
annual employment growth. Our estimate is that the effects would be closer to the 0.01 percent 
reduction unless the public spending cut somehow avoided any major cuts in public services.  
We also consider a third simulation in which we continue these higher effects of taxes on 
business location of a −0.2 elasticity, but assume that the positive effects of an SBT elimination 
can somehow be achieved without cutting public spending or raising household taxes. One 
plausible way to do this would be to replace the current SBT with a new business tax system that 
raises the same revenue but lowers marginal tax rates from the SBT on business investment to 
zero. It is reasonable to assume that it is marginal tax rates on business investment that really 
drive any business tax effects on business location and investment. Zero marginal tax rates under 
the SBT for new business investment could be achieved by going back to the original SBT 
design of a 100 percent tax deduction for new investment or, alternatively, by an investment tax 
credit rate equal to the SBT rate. The revenue loss from this tax credit could be offset by 
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eliminating many special tax provisions of the SBT that have accumulated over the years. We 
estimate that lowering the marginal tax rate on new investment in the SBT to zero would cost 
less than $270 million annually, and we can easily identify revenue offsets in the SBT of over 
$500 million.1  It should be understood that this policy option would raise the business tax 
liability of many Michigan businesses. Specifically it would raise the tax liability of Michigan 
businesses that are not making significant investments. However, the tax liability of businesses 
that are making significant investments would be lowered, so that their marginal tax rate on new 
investment would be zero.  
Under this simulation, SBT elimination would increase annual employment growth rates 
in Michigan by 0.16 percent. This is about one-tenth of Michigan’s current annual growth gap 
that separates it from national growth. 
Finally, we consider a simulation in which SBT elimination is financed by extending the 
sales tax to services. Under this scenario, SBT elimination would increase average annual 
growth by 0.13 percent. This is less than would be achieved by equal-revenue reform of the SBT, 
but is greater than if SBT elimination is financed by cuts in public spending. Increasing the sales 
tax on services reduces somewhat the positive effects of the elimination of the SBT by lowering 
consumer spending. However, cuts in public spending directly eliminate both public sector jobs 
                                                 
1Given that the current investment tax credit under the SBT already reduces the marginal tax rate on 
investment by at least one-third, and that this provision cost $132 million in FY 2006 (Executive Budget Appendix 
on Tax Credits, Deductions, and Exemptions for Fiscal Year 2006), the total cost of lowering this marginal tax rate 
on investment to zero probably is less than an additional $264 million per year. The excess compensation reduction 
provision costs $218 million per year, and the gross receipts reduction provision costs $161 million per year. In 
addition, the exemption for unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, and social security payments costs 
$151 million per year. If we ignore interaction between these SBT provisions and other SBT provisions, eliminating 
just these three provisions of the SBT would raise $530 million per year. In addition, Michigan Senate Fiscal 
Agency memos from December 14, 2005, and September 14, 2005, suggest that rolling back the sales factor weight 
raises about $24 million per 5 percent rollback—i.e., the state would collect $24 million more in revenue if the sales 
factor was reduced from 95 percent to 90 percent—and by much more with a more extensive rollback of the sales 
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and jobs financed by the public sector, while also lowering consumer spending because of this 
elimination of publicly financed jobs. Financing an SBT elimination by cutting government 
spending, as opposed to by increasing the sales tax on services, therefore has less of a positive 
effect on growth because of this extra negative effect of the direct elimination of government 
jobs. 
These results show that business tax reforms of the magnitude of SBT elimination will 
only have, at best, modestly positive effects on the state economy. And even these modestly 
positive effects only occur if policies are adopted to minimize the negative effects of these tax 
cuts on public spending and the quality of public services.  
 
6.  EDUCATION AND MICHIGAN’S COMPETITIVENESS 
Another option to improve Michigan’s competitiveness is to increase the average level of 
education of Michigan’s residents, in the process raising the percentage of Michigan residents 
that have a college degree. As is well known from the work of the Cherry Commission (2004), as 
well as that of various scholars (e.g., Blank and Sallee 2006), Michigan is below average in its 
share of residents with a college degree but above average in its share of residents with a high 
school degree. According to the Digest of Education Statistics, in 2004, 24.4 percent of 
Michigan residents ages 25 and over had a college degree, compared to 27.7 percent in the U.S. 
Also in 2004, 87.9 percent of Michigan residents ages 25 and over had a high school degree, 
compared to 85.2 percent for the U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                             
factor. Therefore, it appears likely that changes in all these SBT provisions could fully finance both lowering the 
marginal tax rate on investment in the SBT to zero and allowing for a lower SBT rate. 
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There is considerable evidence that there is a social return to increasing the percentage of 
a local economy’s residents with a college degree. For example, research by Moretti (2003, 
2004) suggests that a 1.0 point increase in the percentage of college residents in a local economy 
increases the average level of local wages by 0.6 to 1.2 percent. This is an increase over and 
above the increase that occurs for the individuals who get more education; an individual’s wages 
appear to depend both on his or her own education level, and on the average educational level of 
his or her fellow residents of the metropolitan area. In addition, research by Glaeser and Saiz 
suggests that a local economy that has a 1.0 point higher percentage of residents with a college 
education will have growth that is about 0.6 percent higher over a 10-year period (Bartik 2006b, 
interpretation of Glaiser and Saiz 2003). 
Why do these social returns occur? One possibility is that employers are able to use more 
productive technologies, and introduce new technologies more rapidly, if they know they can 
count on an ample supply of more educated workers.  
In the current economy, these extra social returns to education appear to be primarily 
associated with the attainment of a college degree. A higher percentage of workers in a local 
economy with a high school degree does not appear to be associated with any extra social returns 
to wages or any extra effect on local growth. It is the college-educated worker percentage that 
yields the social returns, a phenomenon that presumably reflects what types of skills are 
currently most valuable to employers and in relatively short supply.  
These social returns to education are proportionally large, in that they substantially 
increase the total returns on investment in education. However, they are also modest enough that 
it would take quite a large increase in the percentage of Michigan residents with a college degree 
to close the growth gap between Michigan and the U.S. For example, to close the 1.52 percent 
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gap in annual employment growth between Michigan and the U.S. that occurred over 2000–
2005, the percentage of Michigan residents 25 and over with a college degree would have to 
increase by 25.3 points, that is from the current level of 24.4 percent to 49.7 percent.2 Based on 
population figures by age for Michigan as of July 1, 2004, this would mean the state population 
would currently have to have 1.6 million more college graduates. Thus, to completely close the 
Michigan vs. U.S. gap in annual employment growth through college education alone would 
require doubling the percentage of college graduates in the Michigan economy. 
We can also approach this issue from the other direction:  what increases in college-
educated population in Michigan might be feasible over different time periods?  Suppose we 
somewhat arbitrarily consider what might be feasible in increasing the college-educated 
population in Michigan over a 15-year period. Suppose, further, we imagined that we increased 
the percentage of each cohort of 18-year-olds that achieved a bachelor’s degree or higher by 20 
points. This is a large increase, but there is room to make it. According to the Cherry 
Commission, only 41 percent of Michigan’s 9th graders start college within four years of 9th 
grade—in other words, go straight into college from high school—and only 55 percent of those 
who start college get a bachelor’s degree within six years of starting college. Michigan typically 
has about 150,000 18-year-olds, so 20 percent more completing college is 30,000 extra college 
graduates in each single age cohort (30,000 is 20 percent of the 150,000 18-year-olds). After 15 
years, this increase in educational attainment would have affected the 25-and-over graduate 
percentage by affecting those ages 25 to 33; multiplying 30,000 by these nine years yields an 
increase in college graduates of 270,000. In order for this influx to fully affect the number of 
                                                 
2Based on Glaeser and Saiz, the annual growth rate effect of 1.0 point more college education is about 0.06 
percent; 1.52 percent divided by 0.06 percent yields the required increase in percentage college graduates of 25.3 
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college graduates living in Michigan, we would have to assume an end to the net out-migration 
of younger Michigan graduates. From 1995 to 2000, Michigan lost about 77,000 college 
graduates ages 25–34 (as of April 2000) to other states, and gained 58,000 from other states, for 
a net “brain drain” of 19,000 college graduates. (See Table 7; as this table shows, there is no net 
brain drain from ages 35–54, but there is some brain drain at older ages.) Assume that we 
eliminated this brain drain and that, even with a higher production of college graduates, 
Michigan’s net migration rate in college graduates stays at zero. The elimination of the 25–34 
year old brain drain would increase college graduates in Michigan by about 19,000 every 5 
years, or by 57,000 after 15 years. Adding the increased production of college graduates to the 
elimination of the 25–34 year old brain drain would yield an increase of 327,000 college 
graduates. This increase is about 5 percent of the Michigan population 25 and over. Such an 
increase would be estimated to increase Michigan’s average annual employment growth rate by 
about 0.3 percent, or roughly one-fifth of the gap separating Michigan from the nation. 
Therefore, it takes large changes in educational policy to significantly improve 
Michigan’s growth prospects, and these changes would take some time to have economic growth 
effects. In the long run, this increase of 20 percentage points would work its way through the 
entire labor force. This would take 40 years or more from the time the policy was started, enough 
time for the initial group whose K–16 educational attainment was improved to reach retirement 
age.  Assuming that in-migration and out-migration of college graduates remain balanced, the 
resulting long-run increase in the percentage of college graduates in the Michigan labor force 
                                                                                                                                                             
percent. 
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would be 20 points.  This would go four-fifths of the way toward doubling Michigan’s number 
of college graduates and matching the U.S. employment growth rate. 
What happens if we do a better job of increasing the proportion of Michigan residents 
who obtain a college education, but we make no special effort to increase the attractiveness of 
Michigan to potential migrants with a college education? Under these assumptions, the best 
empirical evidence suggests that, in the long run, the increase in college graduates residing in 
Michigan will be about 30 percent of Michigan’s increased production of college graduates. Data 
on the residential choices of Michigan’s college graduates suggest that with current migration 
patterns, probably 50 to 60 percent of them end up spending most of their working careers in 
Michigan. Table 8, taken from the 2000 Census, shows that of college graduates who were born 
in Michigan, around 50 percent have remained in Michigan for much if not all of their prime 
working ages. Many of these college graduates in fact left Michigan well before college; 
information from other sources suggests that about one-sixth of those who had left Michigan did 
so before age 18 (Bartik 2006b), so it is probably the case that of former 17-year-old Michigan 
residents who have gone to college, the percentage that currently spend most of their working 
careers in Michigan is closer to 60 percent. 
But this is under current migration patterns. A large increase in the percentage of college 
graduates in Michigan will result in labor market changes that may affect both household 
migration patterns and business location decisions. An increase in college graduates in Michigan 
may lower wage rates and increase unemployment rates among college-educated workers in 
Michigan. This change in labor market conditions has two effects: on the one hand, it encourages 
household out-migration and discourages household in-migration to Michigan; on the other 
hand, the greater availability of college-educated labor at lower wages encourages additional 
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businesses that need college-educated labor to locate and expand in Michigan. A new 
equilibrium in the labor market will be established, with both greater net out-migration of 
college-educated workers, and a greater proportion of college-educated workers in the Michigan 
economy, resulting in more businesses operating in Michigan that use college-educated workers. 
Two lines of reasoning suggest that in this new equilibrium the net increase in college-
educated workers will be about 30 percent of Michigan’s increased production of college 
graduates. First, evidence from Bartik (2001) suggests that, in general, the equilibrium response 
to a labor supply shock of a particular type of labor to a local economy is an increase in 
employment of that type of labor of from one-third to two-thirds of the initial labor supply boost. 
As the initial labor supply boost, under current migration patterns, is about 60 percent of the 
increased production of local graduates, the equilibrium increase in employment of college 
graduates will be from one-third to two-thirds of that 60 percent, or 20 to 40 percent.  Second, 
evidence from Bound et al. (2004) directly estimates that an increase in the flow of new college 
graduates in a state increases the stock of college graduates in the state, 5–24 years later, by 30 
percent of the initial flow increase. This 30 percent boost is less than the initial 60 percent boost 
to labor supply because of increased net household out-migration of college-educated workers. It 
is greater than zero because the increased availability of college-educated labor will attract some 
new business activity to Michigan. 
With an eventual increase in the stock equal to about 30 percent of the increased flow, a 
20 point increase in the percentage of Michigan residents getting a college degree, if sustained 
for 15 years, would be expected to increase the stock of college graduates 25 years and older by 
0.30 H 270,000 = 81,000 additional college graduates, or about a 1.2 point increase in 
Michigan’s percentage of college graduates. Based on the results of Glaser and Saiz, this 
 27
increase in the college-educated portion of Michigan’s labor force would be sufficient to 
increase Michigan’s annual employment growth rate by 0.06 percent, a quite modest 
improvement compared to the annual growth gap of 1.52 percent between Michigan and the 
nation. The long-run effects on Michigan=s growth would be about five times stronger; the long-
run increase in the percentage of college graduates in the Michigan labor force would be 6 
percent (20% H 0.3), which would increase Michigan’s annual employment growth rate by 0.30 
percent. 
This suggests that to fully exploit the potential economic growth effects of increasing the 
supply of college-educated workers, Michigan would have to not only increase the proportion of 
residents who receive a college degree, but also adopt policies that can affect migration patterns 
of college-educated workers. These could include measures to improve the amenities and quality 
of life in Michigan as viewed by college-educated workers. They could also include economic 
development measures to increase the labor demand for college-educated workers. In general, 
public policies that boost both labor supply and labor demand at the same time are more 
effective in increasing a state’s economic growth than either labor supply policy or labor demand 
policy is separately. 
A full analysis of the economic development effects of this increase in educational 
attainment would have to also consider the cost of this policy. Presumably, higher K–16 
educational attainment would require some increased public spending and hence some tax 
increases. These increased taxes would have negative economic development effects, and the 
increased public spending would both stimulate the demand side of the economy and make 
Michigan more attractive for household migration and business location decisions. The exact 
magnitude of the effects would depend on the size of the assumed need for public spending 
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increases and on what types of taxes were increased. This report’s results suggest that the net 
effect of such public spending increases, if financed by household tax increases, is likely to be 
positive, whereas the effect of financing these public spending increases by business tax 
increases is likely to be negative.3 
 
7.  OCCUPATIONAL JOB SKILLS AND MICHIGAN=S ECONOMY 
A college education is not the only measure of job skills. Other dimensions of skills 
might also have a considerable social return. For example, one would think that there might be 
some occupational skills that, if amply available, would allow firms in particular industries to 
more readily use advanced technologies or introduce new technologies. Even though Michigan is 
relatively weak in the percentage of its population with a college degree, perhaps the state is 
stronger with respect to some of these key occupational skills. 
Unfortunately, there is no economics literature that has examined how a local economy’s 
availability of specific types of skills, as opposed to college education in general, affects wages 
or growth in particular industries. Therefore, we have to guess about what particular skills might 
be in short supply. Our goal is to identify some occupational skills that might be in short supply 
relative to demand in the U.S., but for which Michigan has a relatively ample supply, and to 
identify the industries to which these occupations might be relevant. 
We approach this task from two perspectives, one focusing on occupational skills that are 
in short supply, and the other on occupational skills that Michigan has a high specialization in. 
                                                 
3Effects in the REMI model are usually roughly additive across scenarios. If we compare the effects of the 
two simulations that show the effects of SBT elimination when financed by spending cuts or service tax increases, 
these suggest that spending increases financed by service tax increases will positively affect the Michigan economy. 
However, the results of these simulations suggest that business tax increases to boost public services may negatively 
affect Michigan=s economy. 
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Table 9 uses the Occupational Employment Statistics database of the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics to list 43 occupations (out of 808 for which there are data) that meet the following two 
criteria: 1) from 1999 to 2005, the annual salary of that occupation increased by over 20 percent, 
and 2) the share of Michigan’s employment in the occupation exceeds the national share of 
employment in that occupation by at least 20 percent. Table 10 uses the same database to list 
occupations that meet the following two criteria: 1) from 1999 to 2005, the annual salary of that 
occupation increased by over 15.5 percent (the inflation rate over this time period), and 2) the 
share of Michigan’s employment in the occupation is more than double the national average. For 
each occupation listed in either table, I also list the industries in which the share of that 
occupation in total industry employment is over eight times the average share of that occupation 
in all employment; that is, these are industries that tend to intensively use those particular 
occupations. 
As these tables reveal, Michigan is strong in a number of highly skilled occupations with 
at least decent wage growth that are intensively used by a wide variety of manufacturing 
industries. In addition, Michigan has some occupational strength in occupations with decent 
wage growth that are in health-related industries. This table does not prove that Michigan’s 
occupational strengths necessarily are a strong lure to all of the detailed industries within these 
industrial categories. Nor is it necessarily the case that all the industries within these industrial 
categories would be good targets for economic development strategies; other factors, such as 
general trends in these industries and the multiplier effects of these industries, would also have to 
be considered. However, this table does offer a list of occupations and industries with which it 
might be fruitful to explore with industry experts the importance of Michigan’s strengths in 
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particular occupations, to see if these strengths can be promoted to attract additional business 
activity. 
 
8.  CONCLUSION 
Michigan’s economy is in a difficult competitive situation. The state is experiencing slow 
employment growth that is largely due to its economic specialization in the Big Three auto 
companies. It is difficult in the short run for any Michigan policy to overcome the negative 
economic effects of the Michigan auto industry’s problems. 
Over the medium run and long run, the state can take actions that will help improve its 
economic performance. Cuts in marginal taxes on business investment may help somewhat if 
they are financed without decreasing public spending and the quality of public services. 
However, such a tax policy requires that taxes be increased on some firms or households to 
finance lower marginal taxes on businesses making investments. Increases in educational 
attainment and attraction of more educated workers may also help the state’s economy, 
particularly in the long run. These policies probably require more public spending to improve 
education and provide amenities for more educated workers, as well as requiring efforts to attract 
employers that use more educated workers. Finally, the state may explore some targeted efforts 
to exploit its already considerable occupational strengths in areas related to design and research 
and development in various manufacturing industries, as well as in areas related to highly skilled 
precision production in these industries.
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Table 1.  Shift-share Analysis of Michigan’s Employment Growth, 1990–2000 and 2000–
2005 
 Annual job growth,
1990–2000 
Annual job growth, 
2000–2005 
2000-05 minus  
1990–2000 
Michigan growth if grew at U.S. average 80.8 11.9 −68.9 
Actual Michigan annual job growth 70.4 −58.0 −128.4 
Difference of Michigan from U.S. annual job 
growth 
−10.4 −69.9 −59.5 
Share effect, by type of industry    
Transportation equipment 1.1 −10.4 −11.6 
Federal government 1.7 0.5 −1.2 
Other export base 1.8 −0.4 −2.2 
Nonexport base −0.4 2.5 2.9 
Total share effect 4.2 −7.9 −12.1 
Shift effect, by type of industry    
Transportation equipment −2.6 −8.8 −6.2 
Federal government 0.6 −0.5 −1.1 
Other export base 1.5 −5.9 −7.4 
Non export base −14.4 −46.9 −32.5 
Total shift effect −14.9 −62.1 −47.2 
    
Sum of share plus shift effect = Michigan growth 
differential 
−10.7 −69.9 −59.2 
 
NOTE: Annual job growth numbers are in thousands of jobs per year. Share effect for each industry represents 
additional job growth (or less job growth) attributable to that industry having a different share of employment in 
Michigan than the national average share, and that industry=s differential growth, or Share effect for industry i during 
time period t is Share(it) = (Eimb − Eimb*)(Git − Gt), where Eimb is actual base year employment in industry in 
Michigan during base period, Eimb* is what employment in the base year in Michigan in that industry would be if 
that industry=s employment share in Michigan was at the national average, Git is the national employment growth 
rate of that industry during time period t, and Gt is average national employment growth rate during that time period 
for all industries. Shift effect for industry i during time period t is Shift (it) = Eimb(Gimt − Git), where Gimt is 
employment growth of that industry during time period. The sum of share effect and shift effects across all industries 
mathematically must equal the differential of Michigan’s overall job growth from national job growth.   
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Table 2.  State and Local Taxes as a Percentage of Personal Income in Michigan and Its 
Neighbors and the U.S., 1970–2004 
 United States Michigan Illinois Indiana Ohio 
1970 11.24 11.07 11.29 9.78 8.83 
1971 11.41 11.84 11.31 10.77 9.00 
1972 12.21 13.00 11.97 11.37 9.84 
1973 12.27 12.82 11.63 10.65 10.13 
1974 11.82 12.27 11.72 10.78 9.51 
1975 11.62 11.57 11.19 10.63 9.32 
1976 11.79 11.87 10.90 9.99 9.53 
1977 11.97 12.34 11.13 9.89 9.34 
1978 11.90 12.10 10.80 9.81 9.33 
1979 11.22 11.93 10.63 9.35 9.22 
1980 10.88 11.17 10.67 8.55 8.83 
1981 10.64 11.19 10.57 8.82 8.69 
1982 10.32 11.18 9.80 8.55 8.86 
1983 10.29 11.81 9.77 8.49 9.56 
1984 10.85 12.83 10.53 9.83 10.23 
1985 10.70 12.21 10.02 9.55 9.87 
1986 10.62 11.62 10.01 9.40 9.87 
1987 10.92 11.44 10.09 9.60 9.90 
1988 11.07 11.80 10.47 10.03 10.14 
1989 11.07 11.76 10.28 10.43 10.28 
1990 10.97 11.40 10.65 9.79 10.22 
1991 10.81 11.20 10.32 10.04 9.95 
1992 11.13 11.11 10.46 10.63 10.29 
1993 11.11 11.62 10.38 10.17 10.20 
1994 11.27 12.02 10.72 10.75 10.68 
1995 11.32 10.76 10.85 10.62 11.08 
1996 11.21 10.91 10.83 10.36 11.10 
1997 11.18 11.22 10.60 11.15 11.10 
1998 11.20 11.34 10.55 10.63 11.09 
1999 10.99 11.28 10.54 10.43 10.98 
2000 11.19 11.32 10.78 10.57 11.25 
2001 10.85 10.87 10.55 10.38 11.19 
2002 10.38 10.25 10.23 10.12 11.11 
2003 10.58 10.33 10.34 10.22 11.21 
2004 11.03 10.52 10.58 10.44 11.43 
NOTE: Data on state and local taxes were obtained directly from the Census Bureau and correct some errors in 
published data. State and local taxes are data for that fiscal year; as is done by most researchers (e.g., Slemrod 2006; 
Ballard 2006), tax rates are calculated by dividing state and local tax collections for a given fiscal year by personal 
income data for the previous year. This is more sensible than dividing by the current year=s personal income as more 
of the tax liability for a given fiscal year is probably based on the previous calendar year=s income. Data for 2001 
and 2003 for individual states were estimated by us. This estimation was done in two steps. First, the tax rates for the 
states and for the U.S. as a whole were interpolated using adjacent years. Then all states and the U.S. were adjusted 
by the ratio of the actual U.S. tax rate for 2001 and 2003 to the interpolated U.S. tax rates for these years. This 
second state adjustment reconciles the U.S. to actual observed data and assumes that the interpolation procedure has 
similar biases for all states. This estimation does not change the relative position of Michigan vs. other states and the 
U.S., and only affects the absolute levels of these tax rates. 
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Table 3.  Michigan’s Average State and Local Business Tax Rates, Compared to the U.S. 
and Nearby States, 2000–2005 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
United States 4.72% 4.48% 4.47% 4.49% 4.66% 4.84% 
Illinois 4.72% 4.50% 4.53% 4.92% 4.82% 5.28% 
Indiana 4.42% 4.23% 4.25% 3.61% 4.36% 4.52% 
Michigan 4.43% 4.25% 4.29% 4.58% 4.35% 4.26% 
Ohio 4.20% 4.07% 4.16% 4.33% 4.51% 4.71% 
 
NOTE: Data on business tax collections come from Ernst and Young (2006, 2005, and 2004). We start with the latest 
data available from Ernst and Young for a given fiscal year for individual states. The 2006 Ernst and Young report 
gives U.S. totals for all these years; these totals are used to adjust proportionally all the states in 2000 and 2003 up or 
down because the reported U.S. total for these years from the 2006 report slightly differs from the U.S. totals 
reported in previous years. The fiscal year data are divided by data obtained by us from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis on private sector gross state product to yield percentage tax rate figures. The fiscal year data are 
divided by the previous calendar year=s private GSP figure. The 2001 figures are estimated by us, in two stages. 
First, the adjacent years are interpolated to give an initial estimate of the state and U.S. tax rate for 2001. Then, all of 
these tax rates are adjusted by the same proportion, with this proportion chosen so that the U.S. tax rate actually 
generates the total state and local business tax revenue that is given by Ernst and Young in their 2006 report.   
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Table 4.  Marginal Tax Rates on Business Investment in a New Plant in a State, Michigan, 
Nearby States, and U.S., 1990 and 1998 
Marginal tax rates on new plant investment, general state and local business taxes 
 1990 1998 
United States 8.5 7.9 
Illinois 5.9 5.5 
Indiana 13.8 13.6 
Michigan 10.0 7.5 
Ohio 10.6 10.0 
   
Marginal tax rates on new plant investment, general state and local business taxes plus general economic 
development incentives 
 1990 1998 
United States 7.6 6.7 
Illinois 5.5 5.1 
Indiana 13.8 10.8 
Michigan 8.0 5.4 
Ohio 10.5 7.8 
 
NOTE: Data are taken from Table 3.3, pp. 62–63 in Peters and Fisher (2002). The U.S. marginal tax rates given are 
the median over the 20 leading industrial states considered. This U.S. average is not quite the same concept as the 
mean U.S. figure considered in previous tables. The tax rate is the present value of net additional state and local 
taxes that occur because of a new plant investment, divided by the present value of pretax profits from the new plant. 
This calculation considers effects of state and local taxes on federal tax liability. The tax rates reported are weighted 
averages over 16 “2-digit SIC” industries, with weights based on each industry=s share of U.S. manufacturing 
employment in 1995.  
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Table 5.  Ratio of Michigan to U.S. Tax Rates for Three Types of Measures of Tax Rates, 
Various Years 
 
Average overall  
state and local taxes 
Average state and local 
business taxes 
Marginal state and local 
business taxes 
1970 0.985   
1971 1.037   
1972 1.065   
1973 1.045   
1974 1.038   
1975 0.996   
1976 1.007   
1977 1.031   
1978 1.017   
1979 1.063   
1980 1.027   
1981 1.052   
1982 1.083   
1983 1.148   
1984 1.182   
1985 1.141   
1986 1.093   
1987 1.048   
1988 1.066   
1989 1.063   
1990 1.039  1.053 
1991 1.036   
1992 0.999   
1993 1.046   
1994 1.066   
1995 0.950   
1996 0.973   
1997 1.003   
1998 1.012  0.806 
1999 1.026   
2000 1.012 0.939  
2001 1.002 0.948  
2002 0.987 0.958  
2003 0.976 1.020  
2004 0.953 0.933  
2005  0.880  
NOTE: These data are taken from the previous tables. Average overall state and local taxes are based on Census data, 
average state and local business taxes are taken from Ernst and Young, and marginal state and local business taxes 
are taken from Peters and Fisher.  Blank = no information available. 
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adjusted to majority 
view in literature, 





effects of SBT 
equivalent cuts in 
marginal taxes, no 




by extension of 
sales taxes to 
services 
Effects on annual 
average Michigan 
employment growth 
rate, 2006–2016  
-0.01% 0.09% 0.16% 0.13% 
 
NOTE: All these estimates use various versions of the REMI model to estimate effects over the 2006–2016 period of 
eliminating business location effects of SBT. First estimates use REMI model estimates of effects of business taxes 
on business location, with a $1.9 billion cut in public spending used to finance elimination of SBT. The second 
column of results forces the REMI model to conform to business location research literature that suggests a long-run 
elasticity of regional business activity with respect to state and local taxes of −0.2. The third column of results 
assumes that we can somehow achieve location effects of eliminating SBT without any sacrifice of revenue, which 
might be feasible through tax reform that made the marginal business tax under SBT equal to zero but modified SBT 
to raise more revenue from existing businesses. The last column of results assumes that SBT elimination is financed 











not living in 
Michigan in 1995, 
but in Michigan in 
2000 
International  







resident in 95, living 
in other state in 2000 
Net migration  
to and from Michigan 
but within U.S,  
1995–2000  
(Domestic in-migrants 
minus out-migrants  
to other states) 
25 to 34 352,280 57,999 23,597 76,772 -18,773 
35 to 44 366,559 37,591 11,561 37,633 -42 
45 to 54 345,481 19,302 4,507 18,907 395 
55 to 64 176,788 6,909 1,838 14,156 -7,247 
65 to 74 91,108 2,753 461 6,740 -3,987 
75 and older 65,424 2,178 233 3,798 -1,620 
 
NOTE: All these data pertain only to Michigan residents or migrants with a college degree.  These data are calculated 
from the PUMS files of the 2000 U.S. Census. We do not have data on the number of Michigan residents with a 
college degree who left the state for another country between 1995 and 2000. However, we suspect that it is less than 
the number of international in-migrants, as Michigan has net immigration from other countries of 100,000 from 1990 




Table 8.  U.S. Census Data on Percentage of College-Educated Persons Born in Michigan 
Who Still Lived in Michigan in 2000, Different Ages 
 
Age 
% still living in Michigan  
in 2000 Age 
% still living in Michigan 
in 2000 
22 65.9 56 51.6 
23 62.4 57 49.6 
24 62.2 58 47.4 
25 58.9 59 45.2 
26 58.4 60 47.0 
27 58.5 61 47.6 
28 55.6 62 47.6 
29 55.5 63 48.5 
30 57.4 64 44.7 
31 54.9 65 47.2 
32 56.9 66 49.6 
33 56.3 67 46.3 
34 58.5 68 43.8 
35 56.8 69 47.2 
36 57.4 70 47.9 
37 54.5 71 45.0 
38 55.6 72 44.4 
39 53.1 73 45.7 
40 50.4 74 46.0 
41 51.1 75 45.3 
42 51.3 76 44.0 
43 52.3 77 51.0 
44 50.2 78 46.5 
45 54.0 79 46.2 
46 53.9 80 47.0 
47 54.5 81 47.9 
48 56.5 82 43.8 
49 53.7 83 47.8 
50 55.1 84 44.3 
51 54.7 85 46.9 
52 55.1 86 41.0 
53 52.5 87 56.3 
54 50.2 88 58.5 
55 50.1 89 66.3 
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NOTE: Data on total nonfarm employment comes from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Employment is rescaled 















































Figure 3.  Michigan’s Overall State and Local Taxes Compared to the U.S., 1970–2004 
 
 NOTE: Data on state and local taxes were obtained directly from the Census Bureau and correct 
some errors in published data. State and local taxes are data for that fiscal year; as is done by 
most researchers (e.g., Slemrod 2006; Ballard 2006), tax rates are calculated by dividing state 
and local tax collections for a given fiscal year by personal income data for the previous year. 
This is more sensible than dividing by the current year=s personal income as more of the tax 
liability for a given fiscal year is probably based on the previous calendar year’s income. Data 
for 2001 and 2003 for individual states were estimated by us. This estimation was done in two 
steps. First, the tax rates for the states and for the U.S. as a whole were interpolated using 
adjacent years. Then all states and the U.S. were adjusted by the ratio of the actual U.S. tax rate 
for 2001 and 2003 to the interpolated U.S. tax rates for these years. This second-state adjustment 
reconciles the U.S. to actual observed data and assumes that the interpolation procedure has 
similar biases for all states. This estimation does not change the relative position of Michigan vs. 































































NOTE: Data on business tax collections come from Ernst and Young (2006, 2005, and 2004). We 
start with the latest data available from Ernst and Young for a given fiscal year for individual 
states. The 2006 Ernst and Young report gives U.S. totals for all of these years; these totals are 
used to adjust proportionally all the states in 2000 and 2003 up or down because the reported 
U.S. total for these years from the 2006 report slightly differs from the U.S. totals reported in 
previous years. The fiscal year data are divided by data obtained by us from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis on private sector gross state product to yield percentage tax rate figures. The 
fiscal year data are divided by the previous calendar year=s private GSP figure. The 2001 figures 
are estimated by us, in two stages. First, the adjacent years are interpolated to give an initial 
estimate of the state and U.S. tax rate for 2001. Then, all these tax rates are adjusted by the same 
proportion, with this proportion chosen so that the U.S. tax rate actually generates the total state 


































NOTE: These data are taken from the previous tables. Average overall state and local taxes are 
based on Census data, average state and local business taxes are taken from Ernst and Young, 









The Competitiveness of Michigan Metropolitan Areas 
 
 
This appendix briefly presents evidence on the economic competitiveness of different 
Michigan metropolitan areas with respect to different factors that are associated with 
employment growth, output growth, per capita income growth, or productivity growth. 
From an economic perspective, a state is not a single economic unit. Rather, a state is a 
collection of different economic regions. Each economic region comprises a labor market, within 
which there is sufficiently mobility of labor that each particular type of labor has a uniform wage 
and availability that pervades the entire local labor market. As labor is the major component of 
business that is value-added, the cost and availability of different types of labor in the local labor 
market shape the attractiveness of the economic region for different types of businesses. The 
local labor market’s wages and employment rates for different types of labor also shape the 
attractiveness of the economic region for migration of different types of households. The 
attractiveness of the area for different types of businesses and households heavily influences the 
economic future of the region. 
The majority of economic production occurs in such local labor markets, or local 
economic regions, that are metropolitan areas.  A metropolitan area is defined as a 
geographically contiguous group of counties (with counties being used purely as a convenient 
geographic unit) within which most commuting flows are contained—that is, the purpose of 
metropolitan area definition is to identify local labor markets. 
The information presented here on the competitiveness of different Michigan 
metropolitan areas was originally collected as part of a project by Randall Eberts and George 
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Erickcek of the Upjohn Institute, along with independent consultant Jack Kleinhenz, on 
indicators of economic competitiveness for different metropolitan areas in northeast Ohio.  Full 
details on this project, including more details on the underlying data, are provided in a working 
paper by Eberts, Erickcek, and Kleinhenz (2006). As part of the analysis of the competitiveness 
of northeast Ohio metropolitan areas, Eberts et al. collected data on 118 metropolitan areas 
throughout the U.S. For this appendix, we have added in data for the Detroit metropolitan area 
and seven other metropolitan areas. 
These competitiveness data on metropolitan areas are summarized as standardized scores 
on eight factors that can be shown to affect some dimension of local economic development. 
These eight factors are derived from a factor analysis of 40 variables that are hypothesized to 
potentially affect some aspect of local economic development. Table A-1, reproduced from 
Table 4 of Eberts et al., shows the factor loadings on the 40 underlying variables that define the 
eight factors. 
As is usual with factor analysis, there is some art to interpreting what the factors are 
actually measuring, and some factors are easier to interpret than others.  The “Skilled 
Workforce” factor not only measures educational attainment, but also whether the local 
workforce is concentrated in professional occupations. “Urban Assimilation” can be interpreted 
as a measure of whether the local labor market has had a lot of foreign immigration. “Racial 
Inclusion” reflects the extent of racial integration. The “Legacy of Place” factor measures, 
among other things, whether the local area has a greater proportion of older housing. The 
“Income Equality” factor measures high neighborhood poverty for children as well as income 
disparities. The “Locational Amenities” factor includes a variety of standard “Places-Rated 
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Almanac” measures of a local area’s attractiveness. The “Business Dynamics” factor measures 
not only whether the area has a lot of employment churning, with many jobs created and 
destroyed, but also whether the area has more small businesses and more nonmanufacturing 
businesses. Finally, the “Urban/Metro Structure” factor reflects both poverty concentration in the 
central city and metro population concentration in the central city. 
These factors are defined so that for seven out of eight of them, all except “Legacy of 
Place,” a higher score on the factor is expected to be positively associated with economic 
development. As is usual with factor analysis, the units of measure are defined so that each 
factor has a mean of zero across the different metropolitan areas, and a standard deviation of one 
across the different metropolitan areas. 
Eberts et al. also empirically estimated how these eight factors were statistically related 
to four measures of local economic development. These relationships were estimated over the 
118 metropolitan areas they included in their study. The measures of economic development that 
were considered were 1994–2004 percentage growth in the metropolitan area in employment, 
output, and productivity, and 1993–2003 percentage growth in the metropolitan area in per 
capita income. Productivity is defined as output per worker, so there is a close relationship 
between what affects the three variables of employment, output, and productivity.  Thus, if a 
factor has large effects on employment growth and productivity growth, it must have large 
effects on output growth. In the long run, if one assumes that increases in productivity growth 
are divided similarly among owners of capital and workers, one would expect increases in 
productivity growth to be closely associated with increases in per capita income growth. 
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However, over the short run and medium run, not all increases in productivity growth need be 
broadly shared. 
Table A-2 reports the results of how these factors affected these economic development 
measures and is reproduced from Table 9 of Eberts et al. As the eight factors all have the same 
standard deviation, the size of a factor’s coefficient estimate roughly reflects the relative 
importance of that factor vs. other factors in influencing that particular measure of economic 
development. Only coefficients that are statistically significant at the 95 percent level are 
included. 
It is no great surprise that the “Skilled Workforce” factor is strongly positively related to 
all four measures of local economic development. In particular, a metro area with a more 
positive “Skilled Workforce” factor is particularly likely to experience high productivity, output, 
and per capita income growth. The Skilled Workforce Factor is the most important variable in 
determining these three measures of economic development. What is perhaps more surprising is 
how important “Urban Assimilation” (or more immigrants) and “Racial Inclusion” (more racial 
integration) are in positively affecting employment, productivity, and output growth.  In 
addition, areas with a high “Legacy of Place” factor (for example, older areas) tend to have 
weaker employment and output growth. Finally, areas with a more positive “Business 
Dynamics” factor (i.e., areas with more business churning, more small businesses, and more 
nonmanufacturing businesses) tend to have higher employment and hence output growth.  
Tables A-3 through A-10 present the factor scores of 126 metropolitan areas on these 
eight factors, with the Michigan metropolitan areas highlighted in bold. We want to particularly 
focus on the Michigan metropolitan areas with factor scores of more than one or less than minus 
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one; these are areas that are more than one standard deviation away from the metropolitan area 
mean. We also focus on the factors that seem to have the strongest relationship to the most 
measures of local economic development.   
First, the Ann Arbor area is, as one might expect, unusually high on the “Skilled 
Workforce” factor, ranking sixth among these 126 metropolitan areas. This emphasizes that the 
below-average college-educated proportion of Michigan, mentioned in the main text of the 
present report, does not characterize all Michigan metropolitan areas. Ann Arbor’s strength on 
“Skilled Workforce” should help encourage continued economic growth in that area, particularly 
in productivity and per capita income. 
Second, Saginaw, Flint, and Detroit all do quite poorly on the “Racial Inclusion” factor, 
which, among other things, measures the extent of racial integration in the metropolitan area. As 
Table A-2 showed, poor scores on this factor are associated with slower local growth in 
employment, productivity, and output. 
Third, the Grand Rapids metropolitan area scores highly on the “Business Dynamics” 
factor, which reflects business churning, the importance of small businesses, and the importance 
of nonmanufacturing businesses. Higher scores on the “Business Dynamics” factor are 
associated with stronger employment growth. 
Fourth, although no individual metropolitan area has a high negative score, all Michigan 
metropolitan areas are below the national average on the “Urban Assimilation” factor, which 




Much else can be gleaned by examining these tables showing how Michigan 
metropolitan areas rank on these various factors. We leave the remainder of this interpretation to 
the reader. 
One policy implication of this analysis is that economic development policy might want 
to look beyond the state level. Michigan’s economic development might be able to build on the 
particular strengths of individual metropolitan areas, for example Ann Arbor’s strength in the 
“Skilled Workforce” factor. In addition, this analysis raises the issue of whether greater openness 
to racial integration and immigration might enhance Michigan’s economic development.
 
 58



















Professional occupation 0.955 0.062 −0.042 0.053 −0.032 0.033 0.017 −0.010 
Graduate degree 0.906 0.064 −0.077 0.006 0.010 0.039 0.075 0.058 
Bachelor’s degree 0.881 0.177 −0.049 0.063 −0.182 0.131 0.081 −0.089 
Skill differences 0.612 −0.083 0.199 0.011 −0.188 0.152 −0.041 0.075 
% population < 16 or > 64 −0.660 0.056 0.142 0.125 0.018 −0.081 0.280 0.142 
Number of patents/employee 0.480 0.142 −0.181 −0.120 −0.176 −0.017 −0.087 0.073 
Productivity information sector 0.456 0.271 −0.042 −0.013 −0.011 −0.049 0.152 −0.025 
         
% foreign-born 0.097 0.927 −0.105 0.023 0.084 0.055 0.153 0.084 
% minority business employee 0.031 0.884 0.056 0.125 0.223 −0.087 0.076 −0.012 
% Hispanic −0.138 0.770 −0.260 0.122 0.250 −0.030 0.142 −0.123 
Cost-of-living index 0.342 0.683 −0.149 0.222 −0.132 −0.002 0.098 0.141 
% Asian 0.341 0.663 −0.180 0.104 −0.056 −0.033 −0.192 0.032 
Commuting time 0.144 0.549 0.256 0.167 −0.080 −0.149 0.168 0.303 
% homeownership −0.160 −0.537 0.223 0.068 −0.349 −0.124 −0.027 0.324 
         
Isolation index −0.034 −0.121 0.928 −0.025 0.182 0.167 −0.017 0.071 
Dissimilarity index −0.157 −0.167 0.826 −0.334 0.009 0.164 −0.031 0.141 
% black 0.061 −0.121 0.587 0.299 0.394 −0.066 −0.058 −0.014 
         
Climate index −0.076 0.469 −0.247 0.623 0.187 −0.050 0.343 0.097 
Gross change in employment due 
to business churning 
0.163 0.356 −0.042 0.618 0.142 0.120 0.470 −0.075 
Number government units −0.164 −0.387 0.117 −0.449 −0.210 −0.070 −0.071 0.038 
Crime index 0.150 −0.217 −0.359 −0.530 −0.352 −0.153 −0.125 0.192 
% of houses built before 1940 −0.035 −0.050 0.137 −0.878 −0.030 0.027 −0.118 0.086 
         
% children living in high poverty 
neighborhoods 
−0.358 0.195 0.128 0.075 0.814 −0.029 0.039 −0.183 
Income inequality −0.005 0.387 0.285 0.206 0.765 −0.028 0.122 −0.054 
         
Transportation index 0.126 −0.099 0.168 −0.026 0.043 0.824 −0.074 −0.155 
Recreation index 0.083 −0.108 0.372 0.142 −0.265 0.584 0.214 0.184 
Arts index 0.525 0.241 0.248 −0.087 −0.244 0.535 −0.067 0.053 
Major university 0.487 0.026 0.074 0.107 0.104 0.520 −0.085 0.086 
Health index 0.445 0.003 0.196 0.019 0.186 0.451 −0.037 0.045 
         
% businesses employing less 
than 20 workers 
−0.023 0.200 −0.032 0.177 −0.047 −0.109 0.832 0.226 
Gross change in employment 
from business churning 
0.163 0.356 −0.042 0.618 0.142 0.120 0.470 −0.075 
Concentration in manufacturing 
employment 
−0.096 −0.151 0.016 −0.261 −0.288 −0.077 −0.693 0.164 
         
Concentration of poverty in core 
city 
0.089 0.107 0.124 −0.141 −0.034 −0.071 0.037 0.716 
% metro population in core city 0.128 −0.034 −0.154 0.098 0.262 −0.021 −0.109 −0.762 
SOURCE:  Reproduced from Table 4, Eberts et al. (2006). 
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Table A-2.  Contribution of Factors to Growth Measures 
 
Factors Employment Output Per capita income Productivity 
Skilled workforce 0.019 0.119 0.039 0.081 
Urban assimilation 0.019 0.083  0.056 
Racial inclusion 0.033 0.081  0.034 
Legacy of place −0.065 −0.077 −0.017  
Income equality 0.025 0.049 0.013  
Locational amenities   0.011  
Business dynamics 0.054 0.041  −0.022 
Urban/metro structure  0.041 0.015  
Adjusted R-squared 0.66 0.64 0.46 0.62 
SOURCE:  Reproduced from Table 9, Eberts et al. (2006). 
 
NOTE:  The growth measures are expressed as percentage changes between 1994 and 2004, except for per capita 




Table A-3.  Rank of Metro Areas on Skilled Workforce Factor Score 
Rank 
Factor 
score Metro area  Rank 
Factor 
score Metro area 
 
1 4.109 Boulder-Longmont CO 63 -0.133 Syracuse NY 
2 2.695 Madison WI 64 -0.141 Jacksonville FL 
3 2.321 Raleigh--Durham--Chapel Hill NC 65 -0.167 Knoxville TN 
4 2.315 Middlesex--Somerset--Hunterdon NJ 66 -0.170 Pensacola FL 
5 2.240 San Jose CA 67 -0.181 Baton Rouge LA 
6 2.179 Ann Arbor MI 68 -0.194 San Luis Obispo CA 
7 2.133 Tallahassee FL 69 -0.212 Augusta-Aiken GA--SC
8 1.700 Austin--San Marcos TX 70 -0.227 Salt Lake City UT 
9 1.594 Seattle—Bellevue-Everett WA 71 -0.242 Springfield MO 
10 1.513 Trenton NJ 72 -0.252 Kalamazoo--Battle Creek MI 
11 1.392 Oakland CA 73 -0.261 Fort Lauderdale TX 
12 1.368 Huntsville AL 74 -0.261 Orlando FL 
13 1.297 Newark NJ 75 -0.296 Saginaw--Bay-Midland MI 
14 1.217 Bergen-Passaic NJ 76 -0.336 Mobile AL 
15 0.910 Atlanta GA 77 -0.363 Tampa--St. Peterburg FL 
16 0.899 Denver CO 78 -0.370 Greensboro-Winston-Salem-High Point NC 
17 0.806 Lincoln NE 79 -0.381 Fayetteville--Springdale--Rogers AR 
18 0.784 Provo-Orem UT 80 -0.382 Melbourne--Titusville--Palm Bay FL 
19 0.754 Lubbock TX 81 -0.397 Macon GA 
20 0.730 Richmond--Petersburg VA 82 -0.409 Reno NV 
21 0.705 Jackson MS 83 -0.442 Toledo OH 
22 0.694 Colorado Springs CO 84 -0.444 Tulsa OK 
23 0.636 Monmouth--Ocean NJ 85 -0.457 Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland MI 
24 0.577 San Diego CA 86 -0.562 Davenport--Moline--Rock Island IA--IL 
25 0.571 Charleston--North Charleston SC 87 -0.585 Peoria--Pekin IL 
26 0.546 Santa Rosa CA 88 -0.595 Reading PA 
27 0.502 Lexington KY 89 -0.596 Tacoma WA 
28 0.501 Orange County CA 90 -0.599 South Bend IN 
29 0.474 Birmingham AL 91 -0.601 Flint MI 
30 0.472 Nashville TN 92 -0.627 Sarasota-Bradenton FL 
31 0.395 Montgomery AL 93 -0.650 Lancaster PA 
32 0.389 Dutchess County NY 94 -0.695 Vallejo--Fairfield--Napa CA 
33 0.379 Rochester NY 95 -0.704 Rockford IL 
34 0.373 Dallas TX 96 -0.743 Fort Myers-Cape Coral FL 
35 0.365 Kansas City MO--KS 97 -0.747 Utica-Rome NY 
36 0.354 Binghamton NY 98 -0.774 York PA 
37 0.312 Lansing--East Lansing MI 99 -0.780 Fort Wayne IN 
38 0.297 Indianapolis IN 100 -0.808 Shreveport--Bossier City LA 
39 0.287 Pittsburgh PA 101 -0.808 Salinas CA 
40 0.278 Detroit MI 102 -0.809 Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson SC 
41 0.276 Boise City ID 103 -0.924 Corpus Christi TX 
42 0.274 Spokane WA 104 -0.928 Miami FL 
43 0.217 Hamilton--Middletown OH 105 -0.929 Appleton--Oshkosh--Neenah WI 
44 0.208 Des Moines IA 106 -0.936 Atlantic--Cape May NJ 
45 0.207 Ventura CA 107 -0.943 Erie PA 
46 0.202 Eugene-Springfield OR 108 -0.967 Youngstown--Warren OH 
47 0.200 Milwaukee-Waukesha WI 109 -1.035 Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton PA 
48 0.167 Cleveland--Lorain—Elyria OH 110 -1.045 Daytona Beach FL 
49 0.155 Santa Barbara CA 111 -1.049 Beaumont--Port Arthur TX 
50 0.137 Dayton-Springfield OH 112 -1.085 Fresno CA 
51 0.131 Houston TX 113 -1.132 Johnson City TN--VA
52 0.094 Galveston--Texas City TX 114 -1.162 Stockton--Lodi CA 
53 0.085 Jersey City NJ 115 -1.187 Canton--Massillon OH 
54 0.083 Buffalo--Niagara Falls NY 116 -1.224 Fayetteville NC 
55 0.064 Tucson AZ 117 -1.272 Fort Pierce FL 
56 0.063 Oklahoma City OK 118 -1.335 Hickory--Morganton--Lenoir NC 
57 0.055 New Orleans LA 119 -1.409 Riverside--San Bernardino CA 
58 0.043 Fort Worth Arlington TX 120 -1.766 Modesto CA 
59 0.028 Little Rock - North Little Rock AR 121 -1.829 Bakersfield CA 
60 -0.010 Akron OH 122 -1.860 Lakeland--Winter Haven FL 
61 -0.074 West Palm Beach FL 123 -1.881 Visalia--Tulare--Porterville CA 




Table A-4.  Rank of Metro Areas on Racial Inclusion Factor Score 
Rank 
Factor 
score Metro Area  Rank 
Factor 
score Metro area 
 
1 -1.923 Eugene--Springfield OR 63 0.081 Knoxville TN 
2 -1.857 Boise City ID 64 0.090 Denver CO 
3 -1.788 Spokane WA 66 0.161 York PA 
4 -1.745 Salt Lake City UT 67 0.164 Orlando FL 
5 -1.658 Tucson AZ 68 0.176 Rochester NY 
6 -1.546 Reno NV 69 0.206 Fort Worth Arlington TX 
7 -1.454 Provo--Orem UT 70 0.213 Vallejo--Fairfield--Napa CA 
8 -1.430 Visalia--Tulare--Porterville CA 71 0.259 Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point NC 
9 -1.420 Boulder--Longmont CO 72 0.288 Daytona Beach FL 
10 -1.403 Modesto CA 73 0.291 Oakland CA 
11 -1.369 Orange County CA 74 0.310 Ann Arbor MI 
12 -1.291 Santa Barbara CA 75 0.334 Macon GA 
13 -1.284 Binghamton NY 76 0.367 Tampa--St. Peterburg FL 
14 -1.250 Johnson City TN--VA 77 0.412 Dallas TX 
15 -1.228 Lincoln NE 78 0.413 Rockford IL 
16 -1.186 Riverside--San Bernardino CA 79 0.418 Syracuse NY 
17 -1.182 Bakersfield CA 80 0.442 Huntsville AL 
18 -1.148 Allentown--Bethlehem--Easton PA 81 0.445 Nashville TN 
19 -1.124 Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton PA 82 0.453 Sarasota--Bradenton FL 
20 -1.087 Fresno CA 83 0.527 Pittsburgh PA 
21 -1.078 Appleton--Oshkosh--Neenah WI 84 0.535 Houston TX 
22 -1.062 Springfield MO 85 0.549 Richmond--Petersburg VA 
23 -1.006 Santa Rosa CA 86 0.631 Little Rock - North Little Rock AR 
24 -0.983 Corpus Christi TX 87 0.680 Tulsa OK 
25 -0.935 Madison WI 88 0.696 West Palm Beach FL 
26 -0.934 Hickory--Morganton--Lenoir NC 89 0.780 Shreveport--Bossier City LA 
27 -0.929 Tacoma WA 90 0.781 Galveston--Texas City TX 
28 -0.928 San Jose CA 91 0.787 Jacksonville FL 
29 -0.876 Colorado Springs CO 92 0.809 Atlantic--Cape May NJ 
30 -0.849 Reading PA 93 0.812 Fort Lauderdale TX 
31 -0.815 Fayetteville--Springdale--Rogers AR 94 0.831 Peoria--Pekin IL 
32 -0.803 Ventura CA 95 0.843 Bergen--Passaic NJ 
33 -0.767 Stockton--Lodi CA 96 0.847 Akron OH 
34 -0.765 Seattle--Bellevue--Everett WA 97 0.852 Monmouth--Ocean NJ 
35 -0.752 San Diego CA 98 0.854 Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland MI 
36 -0.708 San Luis Obispo CA 99 0.859 Fort Myers-Cape Coral FL 
37 -0.676 Greenville--Spartanburg--Anderson SC 100 0.882 Fort Pierce FL 
38 -0.666 Lexington KY 101 0.884 Jersey City NJ 
39 -0.653 Middlesex--Somerset--Hunterdon NJ 102 0.906 Montgomery AL 
40 -0.641 Lancaster PA 103 1.037 Trenton NJ 
41 -0.573 Austin--San Marcos TX 104 1.041 Youngstown--Warren OH 
42 -0.516 Pensacola FL 105 1.083 Fort Wayne IN 
43 -0.482 Fayetteville NC 106 1.151 Toledo OH 
44 -0.473 Lansing--East Lansing MI 107 1.168 Indianapolis IN 
45 -0.434 Davenport--Moline--Rock Island IA--IL 108 1.188 Dayton--Springfield OH 
46 -0.398 Lubbock TX 109 1.210 Buffalo--Niagara Falls NY 
47 -0.396 Utica--Rome NY 110 1.210 Kansas City MO--KS 
48 -0.292 Kalamazoo--Battle Creek MI 111 1.218 Atlanta GA 
49 -0.282 Melbourne--Titusville--Palm Bay FL 112 1.267 Beaumont--Port Arthur TX 
50 -0.213 Canton--Massillon OH 113 1.271 Mobile AL 
51 -0.179 Raleigh--Durham--Chapel Hill NC 114 1.287 Miami FL 
52 -0.163 Erie PA 115 1.288 Baton Rouge LA 
53 -0.158 Charleston--North Charleston SC 116 1.294 Jackson MS 
54 -0.136 Tallahassee FL 118 1.377 Saginaw--Bay-Midland MI 
55 -0.132 Des Moines IA 119 1.394 New Orleans LA 
56 -0.085 Salinas CA 120 1.679 Birmingham AL 
57 -0.074 Hamilton--Middletown OH 121 1.822 Newark NJ 
58 -0.021 Augusta--Aiken GA--SC 122 1.984 Cleveland--Lorain--Elyria OH 
59 -0.012 Dutchess County NY 123 2.055 Milwaukee--Waukesha WI 
60 0.039 Lakeland--Winter Haven FL 124 2.169 Flint MI 
61 0.045 South Bend IN 126 2.685 Detroit MI 




Table A-5.  Rank of Metro Areas on Business Dynamics Factor Score 
Rank 
Factor 
score Metro area  Rank 
Factor 
score Metro area 
 
1 −2.282 San Jose CA 65 −0.054 Buffalo--Niagara Falls NY 
2 −2.222 Hickory--Morganton--Lenoir NC 66 −0.035 Shreveport--Bossier City LA 
3 −1.547 Grand Rapids–Muskegon-Holland MI 67 −0.024 Erie PA 
4 −1.542 Appleton--Oshkosh--Neenah WI 69 −0.003 Rochester NY 
5 −1.304 Dayton--Springfield OH 70 0.019 Austin--San Marcos TX 
6 −1.293 Greenville--Spartanburg--Anderson SC 71 0.028 San Diego CA 
7 −1.269 Stockton--Lodi CA 72 0.031 Des Moines IA 
8 −1.245 Modesto CA 73 0.093 Raleigh--Durham--Chapel Hill NC 
9 −1.223 Fort Wayne IN 74 0.127 Tucson AZ 
10 −1.216 Orange County CA 75 0.146 Corpus Christi TX 
11 −1.187 Rockford IL 76 0.154 Visalia--Tulare--Porterville CA 
12 −1.156 South Bend IN 77 0.175 Springfield MO 
13 −1.096 Milwaukee--Waukesha WI 78 0.215 Lubbock TX 
14 −1.055 Lancaster PA 79 0.222 Binghamton NY 
15 −1.028 York PA 80 0.242 Lincoln NE 
16 −1.020 Hamilton--Middletown OH 81 0.244 Tulsa OK 
17 −0.994 Toledo OH 82 0.249 Little Rock - North Little Rock AR 
18 −0.953 Dallas TX 83 0.259 Bakersfield CA 
19 −0.918 Detroit MI 84 0.272 Oklahoma City OK 
20 −0.907 Kalamazoo--Battle Creek MI 85 0.286 Mobile AL 
21 −0.894 Riverside--San Bernardino CA 86 0.337 Charleston--North Charleston SC 
22 −0.879 Fort Worth Arlington TX 87 0.352 Pittsburgh PA 
23 −0.869 Nashville TN 88 0.374 Seattle--Bellevue--Everett WA 
24 −0.779 Johnson City TN--VA 89 0.381 Santa Barbara CA 
25 −0.773 Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point NC 90 0.434 Salt Lake City UT 
26 −0.749 Fayetteville NC 91 0.467 Reno NV 
27 −0.720 Flint MI 92 0.477 Orlando FL 
28 −0.716 Huntsville AL 93 0.488 Denver CO 
29 −0.697 Oakland CA 94 0.529 Jacksonville FL 
30 −0.687 Houston TX 95 0.551 Tallahassee FL 
31 −0.666 Middlesex--Somerset--Hunterdon NJ 96 0.553 Syracuse NY 
32 −0.653 Akron OH 97 0.605 Galveston--Texas City TX 
33 −0.611 Fayetteville--Springdale--Rogers AR 98 0.613 Eugene--Springfield OR 
34 −0.610 Indianapolis IN 99 0.632 Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton PA 
35 −0.607 Birmingham AL 100 0.665 Lakeland--Winter Haven FL 
36 −0.604 Baton Rouge LA 101 0.666 Tacoma WA 
37 −0.589 Richmond--Petersburg VA 102 0.672 Bergen--Passaic NJ 
39 −0.558 Lansing--East Lansing MI 103 0.702 Boulder--Longmont CO 
40 −0.552 Saginaw—Bay City-Midland MI 104 0.740 Newark NJ 
41 −0.551 Knoxville TN 105 0.807 Boise City ID 
42 −0.539 Canton--Massillon OH 106 0.893 Salinas CA 
43 −0.534 Reading PA 107 0.894 Pensacola FL 
44 −0.515 Augusta--Aiken GA--SC 108 0.895 Colorado Springs CO 
45 −0.490 Madison WI 109 1.012 Tampa--St. Peterburg FL 
46 −0.440 Peoria--Pekin IL 110 1.030 Santa Rosa CA 
47 −0.423 Lexington KY 111 1.073 Spokane WA 
48 −0.418 Cleveland--Lorain--Elyria OH 112 1.085 Jersey City NJ 
49 −0.392 Davenport--Moline--Rock Island IA--IL 113 1.205 Melbourne--Titusville--Palm Bay FL 
50 −0.386 Atlanta GA 114 1.275 San Luis Obispo CA 
51 −0.353 Allentown--Bethlehem--Easton PA 115 1.433 Dutchess County NY 
52 −0.342 Vallejo--Fairfield--Napa CA 116 1.462 Provo--Orem UT 
53 −0.335 Montgomery AL 117 1.561 Fort Lauderdale TX 
55 −0.283 Beaumont--Port Arthur TX 118 1.592 Utica--Rome NY 
56 −0.235 Kansas City MO--KS 119 1.807 Miami FL 
57 −0.212 Ventura CA 120 1.809 Monmouth--Ocean NJ 
58 −0.189 Macon GA 121 1.869 Daytona Beach FL 
59 −0.186 Ann Arbor MI 122 1.941 Fort Myers-Cape Coral FL 
60 −0.182 New Orleans LA 123 2.046 Fort Pierce FL 
61 −0.159 Jackson MS 124 2.206 West Palm Beach FL 
62 −0.123 Youngstown--Warren OH 125 2.212 Sarasota--Bradenton FL 
63 −0.096 Fresno CA 126 2.240 Atlantic--Cape May NJ 




Table A-6.  Rank of Metro Areas on Urban Assimilation Factor Score 
Rank 
Factor 
score Metro area  Rank 
Factor 
score Metro area 
 
1 4.567 Miami FL 63 −0.360 Sarasota--Bradenton FL 
2 4.315 Jersey City NJ 64 −0.362 Tulsa OK 
3 2.937 San Jose CA 65 −0.369 Nashville TN 
4 2.151 Orange County CA 66 −0.374 Kansas City MO--KS 
5 2.113 Oakland CA 67 −0.376 Greenville--Spartanburg--Anderson SC 
6 2.073 Salinas CA 68 −0.378 Augusta--Aiken GA--SC 
7 1.901 Vallejo--Fairfield--Napa CA 69 −0.390 Salt Lake City UT 
8 1.665 Bergen--Passaic NJ 70 −0.391 Toledo OH 
9 1.518 Stockton--Lodi CA 71 −0.392 Fort Myers-Cape Coral FL 
10 1.482 Houston TX 72 −0.416 Lincoln NE 
11 1.381 Ventura CA 73 −0.422 Raleigh--Durham--Chapel Hill NC 
12 1.305 Riverside--San Bernardino CA 74 −0.451 Ann Arbor MI 
13 1.265 Fort Lauderdale TX 75 −0.454 York PA 
14 1.219 Modesto CA 76 −0.468 Davenport--Moline--Rock Island IA--IL 
15 1.157 San Diego CA 77 −0.469 Buffalo--Niagara Falls NY 
16 1.130 Visalia--Tulare--Porterville CA 78 −0.479 Peoria--Pekin IL 
17 1.091 Newark NJ 79 −0.483 Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton PA 
18 1.046 Fresno CA 80 −0.483 Cleveland--Lorain--Elyria OH 
19 1.031 Middlesex--Somerset--Hunterdon NJ 81 −0.485 Melbourne--Titusville--Palm Bay FL 
20 0.894 Dallas TX 82 −0.492 Reading PA 
21 0.845 Trenton NJ 83 −0.506 Appleton--Oshkosh--Neenah WI 
22 0.564 Santa Barbara CA 84 −0.508 Baton Rouge LA 
23 0.555 Corpus Christi TX 85 −0.519 Rochester NY 
24 0.537 Galveston--Texas City TX 86 −0.522 Lubbock TX 
25 0.489 Seattle--Bellevue--Everett WA 87 −0.526 Flint MI 
26 0.474 Austin--San Marcos TX 88 −0.527 Huntsville AL 
27 0.463 Orlando FL 89 −0.548 Des Moines IA 
28 0.452 Denver CO 90 −0.561 Oklahoma City OK 
29 0.366 Bakersfield CA 91 −0.600 Lexington KY 
30 0.350 Reno NV 92 −0.609 Boise City ID 
31 0.319 Fort Worth Arlington TX 93 −0.615 Lansing--East Lansing MI 
32 0.318 Fayetteville NC 94 −0.620 Akron OH 
33 0.306 Santa Rosa CA 95 −0.622 Birmingham AL 
34 0.233 West Palm Beach FL 96 −0.637 Spokane WA 
35 0.211 Tucson AZ 97 −0.638 Erie PA 
36 0.192 Atlanta GA 98 −0.645 Montgomery AL 
37 0.109 Tacoma WA 99 −0.672 Hamilton--Middletown OH 
38 0.102 Tampa--St. Peterburg FL 100 −0.690 Knoxville TN 
39 0.062 Milwaukee--Waukesha WI 101 −0.699 Johnson City TN--VA 
40 −0.007 Dutchess County NY 102 −0.707 Macon GA 
41 −0.049 Monmouth--Ocean NJ 103 −0.711 Provo--Orem UT 
42 −0.074 Jacksonville FL 104 −0.716 Pittsburgh PA 
43 −0.080 Lakeland--Winter Haven FL 105 −0.738 Saginaw—Bay City-Midland MI 
44 −0.127 Rockford IL 106 −0.742 Charleston--North Charleston SC 
45 −0.180 Detroit MI 107 −0.761 Madison WI 
46 −0.214 Beaumont--Port Arthur TX 108 −0.776 Eugene--Springfield OR 
47 −0.226 New Orleans LA 109 −0.789 Canton--Massillon OH 
48 −0.227 Colorado Springs CO 110 −0.803 Youngstown--Warren OH 
49 −0.234 Fayetteville--Springdale--Rogers AR 111 −0.803 Kalamazoo--Battle Creek MI 
50 −0.248 Allentown--Bethlehem--Easton PA 112 −0.804 Boulder--Longmont CO 
51 −0.252 Fort Wayne IN 113 −0.809 Syracuse NY 
52 −0.255 Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point NC 114 −0.812 Daytona Beach FL 
53 −0.259 Hickory--Morganton--Lenoir NC 115 −0.841 Mobile AL 
54 −0.278 Grand Rapids–Muskegon-Holland MI 116 −0.867 Utica--Rome NY 
55 −0.279 Fort Pierce FL 117 −0.871 Little Rock - North Little Rock AR 
56 −0.285 Indianapolis IN 118 −0.893 Shreveport--Bossier City LA 
57 −0.300 Atlantic--Cape May NJ 119 −0.924 Jackson MS 
58 −0.301 Richmond--Petersburg VA 120 −0.978 Springfield MO 
59 −0.312 South Bend IN 121 −0.993 Pensacola FL 
60 −0.315 San Luis Obispo CA 122 −1.037 Binghamton NY 
61 −0.320 Dayton--Springfield OH 123 −1.061 Tallahassee FL 




Table A-7.  Rank of Metro Areas on Legacy of Place Factor Score 
Rank 
Factor 
score Metro area  Rank 
Factor 
score Metro area 
 
1 −3.230 Jersey City NJ 66 0.320 Salt Lake City UT 
2 −2.717 Utica--Rome NY 67 0.346 Oakland CA 
3 −2.462 Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton PA 68 0.369 Eugene--Springfield OR 
4 −2.169 Binghamton NY 69 0.370 Detroit MI 
5 −1.874 Syracuse NY 70 0.374 Colorado Springs CO 
6 −1.759 Rochester NY 71 0.394 Macon GA 
7 −1.617 Bergen--Passaic NJ 72 0.414 Bakersfield CA 
8 −1.582 Buffalo--Niagara Falls NY 73 0.418 San Luis Obispo CA 
9 −1.401 Erie PA 74 0.434 Galveston--Texas City TX 
10 −1.364 Dutchess County NY 75 0.439 Tacoma WA 
11 −1.323 Reading PA 76 0.442 Jackson MS 
12 −1.309 Davenport--Moline--Rock Island IA--IL 77 0.475 Reno NV 
13 −1.285 Lincoln NE 78 0.498 Boise City ID 
14 −1.235 Allentown--Bethlehem--Easton PA 79 0.511 Augusta--Aiken GA--SC 
15 −1.183 Trenton NJ 80 0.513 Boulder--Longmont CO 
16 −1.182 Pittsburgh PA 81 0.527 Raleigh--Durham--Chapel Hill NC 
17 −1.174 Peoria--Pekin IL 82 0.527 Richmond--Petersburg VA 
18 −1.056 Canton--Massillon OH 83 0.556 Shreveport--Bossier City LA 
19 −1.001 Miami FL 84 0.557 Beaumont--Port Arthur TX 
20 −0.980 Appleton--Oshkosh--Neenah WI 85 0.571 Austin--San Marcos TX 
21 −0.975 Des Moines IA 86 0.585 San Diego CA 
22 −0.919 Newark NJ 87 0.603 Santa Rosa CA 
23 −0.900 York PA 88 0.603 Little Rock - North Little Rock AR 
24 −0.880 Toledo OH 89 0.621 Knoxville TN 
25 −0.854 Madison WI 90 0.622 New Orleans LA 
26 −0.851 Lansing--East Lansing MI 91 0.626 San Jose CA 
27 −0.842 South Bend IN 92 0.629 Huntsville AL 
28 −0.829 Lancaster PA 93 0.650 Ventura CA 
29 −0.817 Milwaukee--Waukesha WI 94 0.665 Houston TX 
30 −0.761 Fort Wayne IN 95 0.686 Stockton--Lodi CA 
31 −0.714 Rockford IL 96 0.688 Corpus Christi TX 
32 −0.688 Youngstown--Warren OH 97 0.703 Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point NC 
33 −0.683 Cleveland--Lorain--Elyria OH 98 0.714 Dallas TX 
34 −0.676 Saginaw—Bay City-Midland MI 99 0.728 Fayetteville NC 
36 −0.595 Spokane WA 100 0.737 Greenville--Spartanburg--Anderson SC 
37 −0.539 Springfield MO 101 0.791 Tucson AZ 
38 −0.528 Dayton--Springfield OH 102 0.793 Fort Worth Arlington TX 
39 −0.446 Kalamazoo--Battle Creek MI 103 0.811 Modesto CA 
41 −0.408 Akron OH 104 0.845 Nashville TN 
42 −0.391 Grand Rapids–Muskegon-Holland MI 105 0.873 Fort Lauderdale TX 
43 −0.334 Johnson City TN--VA 106 0.897 Birmingham AL 
45 −0.268 Atlantic--Cape May NJ 107 0.907 West Palm Beach FL 
46 −0.267 Ann Arbor MI 108 0.924 Orange County CA 
47 −0.250 Fayetteville--Springdale--Rogers AR 109 0.982 Melbourne--Titusville--Palm Bay FL 
48 −0.213 Middlesex--Somerset--Hunterdon NJ 110 0.992 Tallahassee FL 
49 −0.184 Visalia--Tulare--Porterville CA 111 0.997 Montgomery AL 
50 −0.178 Indianapolis IN 112 1.003 Pensacola FL 
51 −0.171 Lexington KY 113 1.048 Sarasota--Bradenton FL 
52 −0.149 Fresno CA 114 1.110 Charleston--North Charleston SC 
53 0.001 Denver CO 115 1.125 Lakeland--Winter Haven FL 
54 0.050 Monmouth--Ocean NJ 116 1.160 Vallejo--Fairfield--Napa CA 
55 0.109 Provo--Orem UT 117 1.178 Riverside--San Bernardino CA 
56 0.115 Santa Barbara CA 118 1.178 Mobile AL 
57 0.123 Flint MI 119 1.189 Fort Pierce FL 
58 0.125 Salinas CA 120 1.211 Daytona Beach FL 
59 0.129 Oklahoma City OK 121 1.229 Tampa--St. Peterburg FL 
60 0.135 Kansas City MO--KS 122 1.269 Jacksonville FL 
61 0.147 Tulsa OK 123 1.276 Atlanta GA 
62 0.150 Seattle--Bellevue--Everett WA 124 1.316 Fort Myers-Cape Coral FL 
63 0.189 Lubbock TX 125 1.319 Orlando FL 
64 0.282 Hickory--Morganton--Lenoir NC 126 1.375 Baton Rouge LA 




Table A-8.  Rank of Metro Areas on Income Equality Factor Score 
Rank 
Factor 
score Metro area  Rank 
Factor 
score Metro area 
 
1 −2.542 Vallejo--Fairfield--Napa CA 63 −0.109 Oakland CA 
2 −1.737 Appleton--Oshkosh--Neenah WI 64 −0.102 Allentown--Bethlehem--Easton PA 
3 −1.406 Fort Wayne IN 65 −0.066 Middlesex--Somerset--Hunterdon NJ 
4 −1.381 Santa Rosa CA 66 −0.065 Reading PA 
5 −1.325 Grand Rapids–Muskegon-Holland MI 67 −0.059 Knoxville TN 
6 −1.224 Colorado Springs CO 68 −0.029 Dallas TX 
7 −1.212 Monmouth--Ocean NJ 69 0.011 Erie PA 
8 −1.178 York PA 70 0.043 Austin--San Marcos TX 
9 −1.114 Tacoma WA 71 0.093 Dayton--Springfield OH 
10 −1.100 Lancaster PA 73 0.113 Detroit MI 
11 −1.093 Hamilton--Middletown OH 74 0.113 Kalamazoo--Battle Creek MI 
12 −1.088 Des Moines IA 75 0.154 Johnson City TN--VA 
13 −1.071 Denver CO 76 0.185 Toledo OH 
14 −1.037 Fayetteville--Springdale--Rogers AR 77 0.186 Little Rock - North Little Rock AR 
15 −0.967 Seattle--Bellevue--Everett WA 78 0.189 Eugene--Springfield OR 
16 −0.962 Hickory--Morganton--Lenoir NC 79 0.191 Richmond--Petersburg VA 
17 −0.952 Melbourne--Titusville--Palm Bay FL 80 0.278 Syracuse NY 
18 −0.918 Ventura CA 81 0.285 West Palm Beach FL 
19 −0.895 Sarasota--Bradenton FL 82 0.288 San Diego CA 
20 −0.884 Atlantic--Cape May NJ 83 0.302 Spokane WA 
21 −0.834 Salt Lake City UT 84 0.305 Huntsville AL 
22 −0.824 Peoria--Pekin IL 85 0.339 Oklahoma City OK 
23 −0.816 Orlando FL 86 0.342 Utica--Rome NY 
24 −0.776 Boise City ID 87 0.358 Cleveland--Lorain--Elyria OH 
25 −0.769 Lincoln NE 88 0.376 Saginaw—Bay City-Midland MI 
26 −0.765 Jacksonville FL 89 0.401 Modesto CA 
27 −0.762 Kansas City MO--KS 90 0.406 Lexington KY 
28 −0.753 Dutchess County NY 91 0.409 Raleigh--Durham--Chapel Hill NC 
29 −0.749 Rockford IL 92 0.433 Flint MI 
30 −0.728 Indianapolis IN 93 0.457 Pittsburgh PA 
31 −0.723 Tulsa OK 94 0.470 Boulder--Longmont CO 
32 −0.696 Salinas CA 95 0.589 Trenton NJ 
33 −0.695 Fayetteville NC 96 0.590 Rochester NY 
34 −0.692 San Jose CA 97 0.621 Newark NJ 
35 −0.691 Fort Myers-Cape Coral FL 98 0.650 Riverside--San Bernardino CA 
36 −0.679 Daytona Beach FL 99 0.674 Charleston--North Charleston SC 
37 −0.662 Ann Arbor MI 100 0.768 Beaumont--Port Arthur TX 
38 −0.644 San Luis Obispo CA 101 0.779 Binghamton NY 
39 −0.612 Reno NV 102 0.796 Houston TX 
40 −0.536 Provo--Orem UT 103 0.813 Santa Barbara CA 
41 −0.485 Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point NC 104 0.836 Birmingham AL 
42 −0.458 Fort Lauderdale TX 105 0.858 Buffalo--Niagara Falls NY 
43 −0.430 Fort Pierce FL 106 0.863 Mobile AL 
44 −0.409 Davenport--Moline--Rock Island IA--IL 107 0.868 Augusta--Aiken GA--SC 
45 −0.408 Fort Worth Arlington TX 108 0.902 Miami FL 
46 −0.339 Atlanta GA 109 0.984 Stockton--Lodi CA 
47 −0.338 Bergen--Passaic NJ 111 1.043 Montgomery AL 
48 −0.331 Tampa--St. Peterburg FL 112 1.124 Jersey City NJ 
49 −0.317 Lakeland--Winter Haven FL 113 1.128 Baton Rouge LA 
50 −0.303 Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton PA 114 1.237 Pensacola FL 
51 −0.303 Akron OH 115 1.336 Corpus Christi TX 
52 −0.288 Nashville TN 116 1.368 Tucson AZ 
53 −0.274 Madison WI 117 1.682 Macon GA 
54 −0.253 Canton--Massillon OH 118 1.864 Jackson MS 
55 −0.230 Milwaukee--Waukesha WI 119 1.897 Lubbock TX 
56 −0.174 Springfield MO 121 1.937 Shreveport--Bossier City LA 
57 −0.171 Youngstown--Warren OH 122 2.019 New Orleans LA 
58 −0.150 Lansing--East Lansing MI 123 2.045 Tallahassee FL 
59 −0.136 Greenville--Spartanburg--Anderson SC 124 2.454 Bakersfield CA 
60 −0.127 Galveston--Texas City TX 125 2.861 Fresno CA 
61 −0.126 Orange County CA 126 2.884 Visalia--Tulare--Porterville CA 




Table A-9.  Rank of Metro Areas on Locational Amenities Factor Score 
Rank 
Factor 
score Metro area  Rank 
Factor 
score Metro area 
 
1 2.081 Salt Lake City UT 63 0.037 Erie PA 
2 1.469 Syracuse NY 64 0.020 Lansing--East Lansing MI 
3 1.445 Riverside--San Bernardino CA 65 0.006 San Jose CA 
4 1.433 San Diego CA 66 −0.021 Charleston--North Charleston SC 
5 1.413 Buffalo--Niagara Falls NY 67 −0.049 Binghamton NY 
6 1.291 Miami FL 68 −0.067 Bakersfield CA 
7 1.287 Orlando FL 69 −0.088 Salinas CA 
8 1.284 Tampa--St. Peterburg FL 70 −0.106 South Bend IN 
9 1.236 Indianapolis IN 71 −0.182 Pensacola FL 
10 1.197 Milwaukee--Waukesha WI 72 −0.216 Atlantic--Cape May NJ 
11 1.187 Kansas City MO--KS 73 −0.228 Peoria--Pekin IL 
12 1.176 Pittsburgh PA 74 −0.246 Baton Rouge LA 
13 1.171 Cleveland--Lorain--Elyria OH 75 −0.267 Canton--Massillon OH 
14 1.161 Dallas TX 76 −0.287 Allentown--Bethlehem--Easton PA 
15 1.119 Rochester NY 77 −0.311 Johnson City TN--VA 
16 1.082 Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point NC 78 −0.316 Shreveport--Bossier City LA 
17 1.037 Tucson AZ 79 −0.320 Fayetteville--Springdale--Rogers AR 
18 1.037 West Palm Beach FL 80 −0.331 Mobile AL 
19 0.988 Denver CO 81 −0.393 Daytona Beach FL 
20 0.969 Seattle--Bellevue--Everett WA 82 −0.410 Utica--Rome NY 
21 0.929 Reno NV 83 −0.424 Springfield MO 
22 0.928 Houston TX 84 −0.451 Colorado Springs CO 
23 0.927 Fort Lauderdale TX 85 −0.507 Saginaw—Bay City-Midland MI 
24 0.919 Orange County CA 86 −0.515 San Luis Obispo CA 
25 0.915 Knoxville TN 87 −0.553 Youngstown--Warren OH 
26 0.910 Nashville TN 88 −0.581 Lancaster PA 
27 0.879 Dayton--Springfield OH 89 −0.598 Tallahassee FL 
28 0.869 New Orleans LA 90 −0.607 Melbourne--Titusville--Palm Bay FL 
29 0.857 Oklahoma City OK 91 −0.624 Reading PA 
30 0.855 Fort Worth Arlington TX 92 −0.654 Rockford IL 
31 0.827 Greenville--Spartanburg--Anderson SC 93 −0.723 Corpus Christi TX 
32 0.810 Sarasota--Bradenton FL 94 −0.796 Lubbock TX 
33 0.798 Tacoma WA 95 −0.835 Jackson MS 
34 0.761 Toledo OH 96 −0.863 Hickory--Morganton--Lenoir NC 
35 0.697 Detroit MI 97 −0.872 Huntsville AL 
36 0.696 Atlanta GA 98 −0.936 Santa Rosa CA 
37 0.648 Santa Barbara CA 99 −1.024 Visalia--Tulare--Porterville CA 
38 0.629 Spokane WA 100 −1.054 Ann Arbor MI 
39 0.590 Boise City ID 101 −1.065 Flint MI 
40 0.566 Kalamazoo--Battle Creek MI 102 −1.080 Trenton NJ 
41 0.537 Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton PA 103 −1.126 Lakeland--Winter Haven FL 
42 0.524 Lexington KY 104 −1.127 Provo--Orem UT 
43 0.514 Little Rock - North Little Rock AR 105 −1.164 Modesto CA 
44 0.513 Appleton--Oshkosh--Neenah WI 106 −1.174 Augusta--Aiken GA--SC 
45 0.510 Newark NJ 107 −1.186 Beaumont--Port Arthur TX 
46 0.485 Jacksonville FL 108 −1.209 Jersey City NJ 
47 0.433 Grand Rapids–Muskegon-Holland MI 109 −1.211 Bergen--Passaic NJ 
48 0.432 Akron OH 110 −1.219 Fort Pierce FL 
49 0.417 Raleigh--Durham--Chapel Hill NC 111 −1.240 Middlesex--Somerset--Hunterdon NJ 
50 0.374 Austin--San Marcos TX 112 −1.262 Monmouth--Ocean NJ 
51 0.356 Oakland CA 113 −1.272 Fayetteville NC 
52 0.352 Birmingham AL 114 −1.276 Ventura CA 
53 0.326 Lincoln NE 115 −1.345 Montgomery AL 
54 0.317 Des Moines IA 116 −1.410 Vallejo--Fairfield--Napa CA 
55 0.276 Tulsa OK 117 −1.433 Dutchess County NY 
56 0.274 Eugene--Springfield OR 118 −1.454 Macon GA 
57 0.253 Richmond--Petersburg VA 119 −1.594 Stockton--Lodi CA 
58 0.194 Madison WI 120 −1.647 Boulder--Longmont CO 
59 0.190 Fort Myers-Cape Coral FL 121 −1.750 Hamilton--Middletown OH 
60 0.185 Davenport--Moline--Rock Island IA--IL 122 −1.994 York PA 
61 0.112 Fort Wayne IN 123 −2.394 Galveston--Texas City TX 




Table A-10.  Rank of Metro Areas on Urban/Metro Structure Factor Score 
Rank 
Factor 
score Metro area  Rank 
Factor 
score Metro area 
 
1 −2.721 Lincoln NE 64 −0.003 Tacoma WA 
2 −1.965 Corpus Christi TX 65 0.003 Fort Pierce FL 
3 −1.943 Lubbock TX 67 0.034 Galveston--Texas City TX 
4 −1.787 Colorado Springs CO 68 0.059 Canton--Massillon OH 
5 −1.501 Reno NV 69 0.071 Raleigh--Durham--Chapel Hill NC 
6 −1.491 San Jose CA 70 0.133 Utica--Rome NY 
7 −1.384 Jacksonville FL 71 0.140 Macon GA 
8 −1.327 Des Moines IA 72 0.143 Hamilton--Middletown OH 
9 −1.294 Tulsa OK 73 0.154 Fort Myers-Cape Coral FL 
10 −1.087 Madison WI 74 0.185 Provo--Orem UT 
11 −1.087 Jersey City NJ 75 0.204 Sarasota--Bradenton FL 
12 −1.060 Indianapolis IN 76 0.210 Trenton NJ 
13 −1.046 Oklahoma City OK 77 0.211 Seattle--Bellevue--Everett WA 
14 −1.026 Fort Wayne IN 78 0.255 Binghamton NY 
15 −0.979 Milwaukee--Waukesha WI 79 0.273 Dayton--Springfield OH 
16 −0.944 Montgomery AL 80 0.277 Fayetteville--Springdale--Rogers AR 
17 −0.900 Salinas CA 81 0.277 Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point NC 
18 −0.866 Springfield MO 82 0.278 Ventura CA 
19 −0.854 Austin--San Marcos TX 84 0.339 Melbourne--Titusville--Palm Bay FL 
20 −0.816 Toledo OH 85 0.370 Detroit MI 
21 −0.783 Fresno CA 86 0.383 Oakland CA 
22 −0.775 Shreveport--Bossier City LA 87 0.390 Boulder--Longmont CO 
23 −0.731 Tucson AZ 88 0.403 Cleveland--Lorain--Elyria OH 
24 −0.716 Peoria--Pekin IL 89 0.421 San Luis Obispo CA 
25 −0.699 Rockford IL 90 0.452 Youngstown--Warren OH 
26 −0.695 Fayetteville NC 91 0.458 Knoxville TN 
27 −0.686 Tallahassee FL 92 0.460 Daytona Beach FL 
28 −0.684 San Diego CA 93 0.486 Lakeland--Winter Haven FL 
29 −0.639 Spokane WA 94 0.500 Augusta--Aiken GA--SC 
30 −0.612 Lexington KY 95 0.508 Birmingham AL 
31 −0.542 Little Rock - North Little Rock AR 96 0.551 Rochester NY 
32 −0.514 Jackson MS 97 0.559 Reading PA 
33 −0.508 Vallejo--Fairfield--Napa CA 98 0.584 Salt Lake City UT 
34 −0.445 Erie PA 99 0.612 Orlando FL 
35 −0.436 Stockton--Lodi CA 100 0.613 Tampa--St. Peterburg FL 
36 −0.404 Beaumont--Port Arthur TX 101 0.628 Ann Arbor MI 
37 −0.394 Mobile AL 102 0.640 Atlantic--Cape May NJ 
38 −0.388 Kansas City MO--KS 103 0.695 Richmond--Petersburg VA 
39 −0.366 Nashville TN 104 0.770 Charleston--North Charleston SC 
40 −0.364 South Bend IN 105 0.781 Fort Lauderdale TX 
41 −0.329 Baton Rouge LA 106 0.808 Lancaster PA 
42 −0.328 Bakersfield CA 107 0.816 Kalamazoo--Battle Creek MI 
43 −0.320 Huntsville AL 108 0.871 Orange County CA 
44 −0.316 Eugene--Springfield OR 109 0.923 Allentown--Bethlehem--Easton PA 
45 −0.310 Akron OH 110 0.944 Pensacola FL 
46 −0.277 Denver CO 111 0.958 Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton PA 
47 −0.258 Modesto CA 112 0.963 Miami FL 
48 −0.250 Santa Barbara CA 113 1.030 Dutchess County NY 
49 −0.197 Davenport--Moline--Rock Island IA--IL 114 1.050 Newark NJ 
50 −0.181 Boise City ID 115 1.064 Saginaw—Bay City-Midland MI 
52 −0.175 Fort Worth Arlington TX 116 1.084 York PA 
53 −0.174 Flint MI 117 1.223 West Palm Beach FL 
54 −0.132 New Orleans LA 118 1.245 Hickory--Morganton--Lenoir NC 
55 −0.111 Lansing--East Lansing MI 119 1.246 Monmouth--Ocean NJ 
56 −0.103 Santa Rosa CA 120 1.279 Pittsburgh PA 
57 −0.067 Houston TX 121 1.292 Bergen--Passaic NJ 
58 −0.066 Visalia--Tulare--Porterville CA 122 1.402 Johnson City TN--VA 
59 −0.057 Buffalo--Niagara Falls NY 123 1.425 Atlanta GA 
60 −0.049 Appleton--Oshkosh--Neenah WI 124 1.707 Riverside--San Bernardino CA 
61 −0.011 Dallas TX 125 2.044 Greenville--Spartanburg--Anderson SC 
62 −0.006 Syracuse NY 126 3.673 Middlesex--Somerset--Hunterdon NJ 
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